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AFIT/GEM/ENV/10-M11
Abstract

The United States (U.S.) electric grid is considered one of the greatest inventions
of the twentieth century, yet it become apparent over the past few decades that it is not
without its own set of problems. The deregulation of the U.S. electric system in the late
1990s eliminated monopolies and resulted in the nation's generation, transmission, and
distribution systems becoming separate entities owned and operated by multiple
companies. This created a market economy in which many electric companies failed to
plan for the future, did not invest in maintenance and upgrades, and began to push the
aggregate system to its maximum capacity. A number of cascading power outages in the
late 1990s, culminated by the complete blackout of the northeastern U.S. in 2003, have
subsequently caused the federal government to question the reliability of the nation's
deregulated electric grid and take action to remedy current issues.
Therefore, the objective of this study was to leverage the trend and spatial
analysis capabilities embedded in typical geographic information system (GIS) platforms
to examine power outage data from the Energy Information Administration (EIA).
Utilizing the industry standard for GIS, ArcGIS, interpolation using the inverse distance
weighted approach was used to calculate preliminary vulnerability levels at military
installations based on EIA’s power outage database from 2000 to 2009. The results of
the study offer insight that will help key stakeholders better understand the state of the
nation's electric grid and identify areas of concern. This allows stakeholders to be in a
better position to address associated vulnerabilities by making appropriate plans for either
system upgrades or mitigation efforts.
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SECURITY VULNERABILITY TRENDS RELATED TO ELECTRIC
POWER SUPPLIED AT MILITARY INSTALLATIONS

Chapter 1. Introduction

Vulnerability and security concerns with the electric grid are increasing as the
United States (U.S.) continues to “operate critical infrastructure systems closer to their
stability or capacity limits” (Mili, Qiu, & Phadkey, 2004). Compounding this concern is
the overall effect on the nation’s power grid by significant events within the past decade,
to include deregulation, terrorist attacks, and natural disasters (Mili et al., 2004; Lerner,
2003; Masse, O’Neill, & Rollins, 2007). Questions have also arisen regarding power
companies’ abilities to deliver reliable power to U.S. consumers. These concerns have
sparked the creation of regulations aimed at mitigating power failures. However, with
regulation efforts still in the early stages, it is unclear if vulnerability and security
concerns with the electric grid will be resolved or if historical trends are an indicator of
future regional power reliability problems. (Mili, Qiu, & Phadkey, 2004; Lerner, 2003; Masse, O'Neill, & Rollins, 2007)
Researchers who have investigated the underlying causes of reported power
failures have observed an inverse relationship between power consumption and power
system maintenance (Rietz, 2008). This is partially due to the failure of the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to adequately regulate the nation’s power
system (Ayres, Ayres, & Pokrovsky, 2005). The FERC regulates the nation’s power
system without sufficient manning to effectively manage and create reliability standards.
As a result, the North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) was created in 1968
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as an “informal, voluntary organization of operating personnel to facilitate coordination
of the bulk power system” (NERC, 2008; About FERC, 2009). It was anticipated that by
combining the FERC’s regulatory power and the NERC’s technical expertise, the power
grid should improve in overall reliability and quality. However, prior to the passing of
the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct 2005), the NERC lacked sufficient authority to
enforce their own standards.
Rising concerns with the current status of the power grid is not limited to
consumers and has the potential to significantly impact the Department of Defense
(DoD). The increasing frequency of power failures within the national grid (Mili et al.,
2004) is a concern among base commanders, yet instances of prolonged outages raise the
largest concern since mission capability can be seriously jeopardized (Defense Science
Board Task Force, 2008). Vulnerabilities within the electric grid have raised interest
among military installations as they come to the realization that they are more vulnerable
to power issues as they have become increasingly dependent on commercial power. Each
incident reinforces the notion that bases must be able to adequately supply power to their
critical infrastructure to maintain mission capability. Unfortunately, no tool exists to
determine overall vulnerability to future power outages at military installations.
Therefore, this research attempts to fill that void by utilizing geographic information
systems (GIS) to determine the associated vulnerability to future outages. Utilizing
historical power outage information and interpolation tools within GIS, it is possible to
develop detailed maps showing historical vulnerability levels across the U.S.
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Background
The need for reliable power is an increasing concern for consumers as the
dependence on electricity to perform routine activities has increased. This is also true for
military installations as the need for consistent power to critical infrastructure and
facilities has become a requirement for continual mission operations. However, recent
widespread power failures have identified several weaknesses within the nation’s power
grid (Mili et al., 2004). Weaknesses ranging from deteriorated equipment to lack of
physical security amplify the grid’s vulnerability to not only a terrorist attack but also to
human errors that result in catastrophic failures (Cieslewicz, 2004). These areas have
been the basis for the increased concerns regarding power reliability and the focus of both
the NERC and FERC to help mitigate rising concerns.
The FERC was initially intended to “regulate the sale and transportation of
electricity” (History of FERC, 2009). Over the years though, the FERC gained additional
responsibilities such that the sale and transportation of electricity was no longer its main
focus. In 1962, the electric industry created the NERC, an informal voluntary
organization of operating personnel, to facilitate coordination of the power system in the
U.S. and Canada in an effort to manage the grid’s increasing complexity and size.
Unfortunately, the policies created by the NERC included voluntary compliance that
were not mandated until EPAct 2005 (Abshier, 2007; McDonald, 2008). The power
wielded by the FERC was limited to regulating existing standards, whereas the NERC
was responsible for creating standards but lacked regulatory authority (Mili et al., 2004).
Basically, the NERC is aware of problems within the electric grid and creates policies to
correct the situation yet lacks adequate authority to mandate compliance.
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The FERC-mandated deregulation of the electric industry created additional
problems with the electric grid as the dynamics of transmission and distribution were
altered. Deregulation attempted to create a market economy and provide open access for
any electricity supplier. However, it essentially forced inter-reliance on existing
transmission and distribution power lines. Although not initially anticipated,
deregulation minimized direct government involvement in ensuring the system was being
managed and maintained adequately (McDonald, 2008). Prior to deregulation, power
was supplied to users through geographically separated electric companies who
maintained their own power generation and transmission capabilities. Therefore,
companies had a vested interest in maintaining their assets to ensure not only adequate
supply capability but also future growth capability. Following deregulation in 1996
though, no single electric company could own multiple components of the electric grid’s
generation, transmission, and distribution lines. This aided in the elimination of any
monopolies and created a market economy in which electricity began to be traded as a
commodity (Arrillaga, Bollen, & Watson, 2000). Unfortunately, as these components
became separate entities, owned and operated by multiple companies, companies failed to
plan for the future and began to push existing lines to maximum capacity (Lerner, 2003).
It became evident during a rash of power outages in 1996, 1998, and 1999 that
deregulation did not solve the problems with widespread outages; instead, it put
additional stress on the electric grid as systems were operated closer to their maximum
capacity and little money was invested in maintenance and upgrades (Arrillaga et al.,
2000; Lerner, 2003).
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The consequences from the failed attempt of deregulation ultimately raised
concerns with consumers as they became increasingly reliant on power and the
responsiveness of electric companies during outages and emergencies (McDonald, 2008).
This essentially resulted in a blind dependence on financially motivated companies
supplying a service critical to nearly all aspects of modern-day life. In fact, power
outages are not only inconvenient but can cost consumers significant amounts of money.
Assigning a monetary value to power outages has sparked multiple studies intended to
investigate the costs associated with power outages within residential, commercial, and
industrial consumers (Eto & LaCommare, 2008). The studies estimate that power
interruptions within the U.S. cost consumers anywhere from $22 to $135 billion each
year (LaCommare & Eto, 2004). Although this financial burden felt by most consumers
is quite high, it does not necessarily compare with Air Force installations and the possible
impact on critical missions and national security.
The decreasing reliability of the national power grid has also received attention
within the DoD and Air Force regarding how to address the deteriorating power grid and
efforts to mitigate its risks (Aimone, 2009; Defense Science Board Task Force, 2008).
Part of the concern for the Air Force is that existing manning levels have limited the
service’s capabilities to provide backup power to critical infrastructure assets which are
tested only for intermittent power outages (HQ AFCESA/CEOA, 2009; HQ
AFCESA/CES, 2005). In fact, Air Force installations have become so dependent on
reliable power that manning for internal power generation and electrical support has
steadily decreased. One of the main reasons for this decrease has been a need to commit
more funds to the replacement of deteriorating airframes (Scully, 2008). The manning
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and associated funding cuts were justified based on the assumption that the local grid is
capable of supplying reliable power needed for the base to operate. There is a downside
to this increased reliance though, which is the resulting lack of organic base capability to
provide sufficient power to counter the increasing number of power failures in both
duration and magnitude (Mili et al., 2004).
According to Air Force policy, “it is important to identify and protect those
(critical) infrastructures that are truly critical to the Air Force so it can accomplish its
worldwide mission” (Dix, 2006). However, problems exist within each base in
determining the critical assets necessary to sustain mission operations since each base
organization feels they constitute a critical function. This in turn creates confusion about
which facilities to support during power outages and makes apparent the inability to
support a large volume of requests. In conjunction with the Air Force Civil Engineer’s
lack of adequate capabilities and manning, the backup capability on Air Force
installations cannot be adequately determined (Defense Science Board Task Force, 2008).
Air Force guidance regarding emergency generator management sparsely mentions
prolonged power outages and focuses mainly on intermittent power failures (HQ
AFCESA/CEOA, 2009). This lack of planning for a worst-case scenario compounds
electricity concerns if power failures persist beyond the planned duration of generator
fuel and manning capabilities.
The intention of this research was to demonstrate an approach to assessing
vulnerabilities to certain types of power outages. Although the findings are specific to
Air Force installations, they are considered generalizable to other non-DoD agencies as
well. Additionally, many private organizations share the Air Force’s concerns regarding
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the reliability of the power grid, yet their motivation lies mainly with minimizing
financial losses due to the loss of worker productivity. This analysis of power outages
surrounding Air Force installations will address associated vulnerabilities while
proposing ways to help mitigate concerns for future outages.

Problem Statement
As a whole, the nation has become increasingly dependent on reliable power to
perform daily operations. However, it is not until power is lost that individuals realize
how dependent society has become on the availability of consistent, reliable electricity.
Herein lies the problem with which this study is focused: increased dependence on
electricity has made people and organizations more vulnerable to the effects of prolonged
commercial power outages. To address this problem, this research relied on the Air
Force as a case study.
Problems with reliable power will not go away anytime soon and will continue to
have a significant impact on consumers until they are addressed. With the concerns over
forced deregulation and changes within the power grid, it is no longer realistic to simply
rely on supplied power. Power supplied over the electric grid tends to be at the mercy of
old technology operating outside its suggested life expectancy. As a result, deteriorated
equipment has spiked a large increase in blackouts in recent years and has brought to the
forefront the issue of the nation’s electric grid (Abshier, 2007). Although efforts by the
FERC and the NERC are underway to standardize security measures across the electric
grid, efforts will require time to be completely developed and implemented. Meanwhile,
the electric grid is still failing to provide uninterrupted power to consumers. This will
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continue to be problematic to DoD installations and their ability to sustain operations
during prolonged power outages.

Research Questions
There were two main research objectives for this study. The first question: “what
vulnerabilities exist at Air Force installations for future power outages?” The calculated
level at each installation provides a score based on different components of historical
power outages. These vulnerability scores serve as the basis to address the second
question: “how can these vulnerabilities be reduced at the installations?” These research
questions focused on the individual components of power outages and their implications
to Air Force installations. The findings will help installations address concerns with
supplied power and provide a basis for the Air Force to assess their available generation
assets and power generation strategy.

Methodology
This study focuses on trend analysis of power outages throughout the U.S. based
on reported power outage data from the Energy Information Administration (EIA). Data
for this study was collected from the EIA’s major disturbances and unusual occurrences
database which contains information about reported power outages from January 2000 to
September 2009. Of particular interest in this database is information regarding power
outages relating to the responsible power company, duration, location, power loss, cause,
and number of people affected. The database was initially reviewed for errors and then
geographic orientation was added to each data point for use within GIS. The software

8

being utilized, ArcGIS, is offered by the Environmental Systems Research Institute, Inc.
(ESRI). ArcGIS contains the Spatial Analyst Tools necessary to perform the analysis.
The EIA’s power outage database was inputted into ArcGIS and analyzed using
the inverse distance weighted (IDW) approach to interpolate the values between known
points based on distance and weighted values. IDW was performed for each of the
components identified above, resulting in separate maps for power outage duration,
power loss, and number of people affected. Utilizing the raster calculator in ArcGIS, the
three maps were consolidated into a single output showing overall vulnerability levels.
From this map, assessments can be made regarding which bases are more vulnerable to
power outages caused by failing transmission equipment.

Assumptions
There were four primary assumptions that needed to be made in order to perform
the analysis for this research. First, it is assumed that the EIA power outage data could
be generalized within each region. Since the EIA data lacked exact coordinates of the
power failure or the specifics regarding the customers affected, it was assumed that
power outages were central to each power company’s service area and uniformly affected
customers from the center of the service area outwards. Second, it is assumed that the
past trends of power failures are in fact good predictors of future occurrences, even
considering the major improvements being made to the electric grid. Third, it is assumed
that all power companies provide reports on identical types of power outages, making the
data collected uniform across the U.S. Last, despite inherent differences between
environmental conditions, operating conditions, and missions at bases across the Air
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Force, the findings and recommendations developed during this study were assumed
applicable to all installations.

Limitations
The primary limitation affecting the research was the fact that all of the data being
utilized is second-hand from government agencies. As a result, there are a limited
number of data points which can be used with no opportunity to get additional data. In
particular, the exact origin of and exact customers affected by power outages is lacking
within the databases, so each data point must be generalized to each utility company
region and the affected customers. This is not only an assumption but also a limitation
since the EIA requires this information to be reported immediately following an outage,
yet the information is not available to the public. This limitation affects the overall IDW
calculations since the analysis uses distances; with data points overlapping, the output is
slightly skewed towards areas with higher numbers of outages. The final limitation is the
lack of previous research using IDW and the raster calculator in ArcGIS as a means to
verify the calculated information.

Significance of Study
It is anticipated that this study will alert Air Force leadership to installations that
are increasingly vulnerable to power outages. Included within this finding will be
statistics based on the overall type and duration of typical power outages within areas
surrounding Air Force installations. This study builds upon previous studies pertaining to
energy management by creating a tool to adequately understand the service provided by

10

electric companies. The results from this study can be generalized to other defense
branches and also large-scale industrial/commercial business such that they can take
action to minimize affects from future power outages. This study helps the Air Force
assess available assets and provides a solid foundation for transforming current energy
management practices to ensure the Air Force mission is maintained during outages.

Organization of Remaining Chapters
Following this introductory chapter, there are four additional chapters to this
thesis. The second chapter consists of a literature review that covers various topics
relevant to power sustainment and reliability. The third chapter is a detailed overview of
the methodology for the study, to include data collection, GIS overview, and risk
assessment model construction. Results and discussions are presented in the fourth
chapter, which explains all the findings from the GIS data analysis and provides a
detailed description of each focus area from the model. The final chapter serves as a
conclusion to the study and reviews all important details from the entire thesis process.
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Chapter 2. Literature Review

The purpose of the literature review was to identify and analyze documents
containing information relevant to the nation’s bulk power system and the impact of
associated vulnerabilities on Air Force operations. The bulk power system, or national
grid, is continually evolving with some of the larger changes occurring in regulation over
the past few decades (Apt, Lave, & Morgan, 2006). This includes the stressing of
existing power lines to meet demand increases which have resulted in numerous power
outages. However, these fluctuations have initiated a transformation to modernize the
power grid to meet current and future needs. Efforts such as deregulation and the Energy
Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct 2005) were efforts to revolutionize the electric grid.
Mitigation efforts at the consumer level have been a step in the right direction, yet
concerns still exist regarding the advancement of technology and future demands of the
electric grid. To this point, many researchers have focused on the statistical analysis of
power outages for trends relating to the duration and cause of the outage. The utilization
of geographic information systems (GIS) to perform the analysis allows proximity to
outages to be considered.

Evolution of the Bulk Power System
The nation’s bulk power system, also known as the United States (U.S.) electric
grid, is a massively interconnected web of power lines supplying electricity across the
U.S. and Canada. Initially designed as vertical delivery systems with single companies
being responsible for generation, transmission, and distribution as shown in Figure 1, the
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system has been transformed such that power now flows from the generator to the enduser through nearly unlimited paths.

Figure 1. Nation’s Power Grid Physical Structure (About NERC, 2010)

Defining the Nation’s Power Grid
The national electric grid achieves power delivery by more than 3,100 electric
utilities through three grids with limited interconnections (U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, 2007). The combination of existing transmission lines and other equipment
being more than 25 years old, there is reduced reliability in multiple regions of the
national electric grid. Lower reliability often results in power interruptions in the form of
a brownout or a blackout. A blackout represents an instance of complete power loss,
while a brownout typically describes momentary fluctuations in voltage. Within these
two types of power fluctuations are both short-term and long-term events, which
encompass the reliability of supply, quality of power offered, and provision of
information (Arrillaga et al., 2000).
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Power reliability addresses all voltage changes and power losses due to
complications within the electric grid. Since 1984, an average of 700,000 customers have
been affected annually by power outages (Amin, 2005). In an effort to curb the rising
concerns regarding power reliability, an increased focus on stability and security has been
aimed at improving the nation’s electric grid (Anjia, Jiaxi, & Zhizhong, 2006). However,
one of the immediate obstacles to overcome with the existing electric grid is that most of
the equipment is more than 25 years old. As electricity usage continues to grow, the
reserve margin decreases on the existing power lines and increases the chance for future
power failures (Mili et al., 2004; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2007; Brown,
2005). Over time, the electrical equipment loses the ability to transport its original design
load due to deterioration, thus making it less able to handle increasing consumer
demands. Operating power lines close to their reserve margin increases the stress on the
lines, thereby reducing their safety factor and making the lines more susceptible to
failing. (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2007; Brown, 2005)
One of the most prominent power problems, as identified by experts, are
momentary voltage sags (Arrillaga et al., 2000). These momentary sags are extremely
problematic for larger industrial and commercial consumers who have a low tolerance for
power fluctuations in which any change can shut down business operations for an
extended period of time. This idea follows the ‘first-law’ efficiency created by Ayres et
al. (2005) which refers to the ratio of useful outputs to inputs. In particular, the
consumer’s requirement for consistent power (output) is much more valuable to them
than the money they pay for it (input), as it multiplies their ability to make additional
money. In addition to momentary power sags, large-scale blackouts are extremely
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problematic for consumers and unfortunately have become more frequent in recent years
(Mili et al., 2004). Some researchers (e.g., Mili et al., 2004; Eto & LaCommare, 2008)
feel the increasing number of large-scale blackouts is a direct result of the transmission of
power over long distances on a grid that was not designed for it. Complicating matters
further, the capacity for improvements and expansions to the electric grid is severely
limited by costs.

Power Fluctuation Implications
Prior research has aimed at investigating the different components of power
fluctuations as well as identifying rising concerns within the U.S. electric grid. In
particular, momentary power fluctuations (less than five minutes in duration) have a
greater impact on organizations than larger, less frequent events. Unfortunately, utility
companies are not required to report minor events to federal agencies (LaCommare &
Eto, 2004). However, under certain circumstances, these small outages can domino into
a much larger event that affects a wider range of consumers (Dobson, 2007).
LaCommare and Eto (2004) determined that the costs associated with power
fluctuations tend to be driven by frequency rather than duration, with momentary outages
accounting for nearly two-thirds of the overall cost to the U.S. Annually, these costs
have been determined to range between $22 and $135 billion (LaCommare & Eto, 2004).
However, the incurred losses to businesses is not directly proportional to the duration of
the power fluctuation (LaCommare & Eto, 2004; Hines, Apt, & Talukdar, 2008); in other
words, longer duration outages may not necessarily result in the highest monetary losses.
The main reason for this difference is the result of businesses’ ability to adapt to the lack
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of power as the outage continues. Therefore, losses incurred later in an event do not have
the same impact as those at the beginning of the event. Concerning this large cost of
power outages, Brown (2005) estimated that for every dollar of lost electricity sales, costs
incurred by businesses exceeded more than $100. Building on this idea, electricity can be
thought of as a multiplier where more revenue is made than spent on electricity when
power is on; however, when electricity is off, additional money must be spent to pay for
workers while productivity is low. This does not take into consideration special
organizations, such as the DoD, where mission degradation is more critical than monetary
losses and can have far greater consequences.

Recent Power Fluctuation Examples
Power outages throughout the last 50 years have identified major concerns within
the power grid regarding reliability and power quality. Investigations of both the 1965
cascading blackout of the Northeastern U.S. and the 2003 cascading blackout that also
darkened the Northeastern U.S. have revealed key problem areas with the nation’s
electric grid. In particular, the results from the two events revealed both human error and
a need for better communication between power areas. Both areas need to be addressed
to improve system reliability. With each major power fluctuation, additional research is
undertaken to better understand and prevent future outages (Brown, 2005; Abshier,
2007). Although interest regarding power fluctuations has increased, some researchers
feel as though power failures are “nearly an unavoidable product of a collision between
the physics of the system and the economic rules that now regulate them” (Lerner, 2003).
The inability to successfully prevent power outages is a direct result of unexpected
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events, lack of system understanding, inadequate feedback controls, poor maintenance,
and operator error (Hauer & Dagle, 1999).
The past 50 years is full of large-scale power outages, to include cascading power
outages which are among the most problematic. Some of the more memorable power
outages in recent years have been the blackouts in the western part of the U.S. in 1996,
the rolling blackouts experienced in California in the summer of 2001, and the cascading
blackout that plagued the northeastern U.S. and Canada in August 2003 (Hauer & Dagle,
1999; Mili et al., 2004; Apt et al., 2006; Lerner, 2003; Amin, 2005). From the available
research (Ayres et al., 2005; EIA, 2009; Hauer & Dagle, 1999), Figure 2 was created to
provide a visual representation of major power outages and the resulting regulatory
efforts. Each of these events affected more than a local community, and they also
represented many of the reasons for power fluctuations identified by Hauer & Dagle
(1999).
The western U.S., especially California, has experienced its fair share of power
reliability issues within the past 20 years. In July of 1996, one instance of power failure
left 2.2 million California residents without power (Mili et al., 2004). In 2001, California
experienced outages similar to those in 1996; however, with the increasing population
growth, the effects were much larger and farther reaching. The resulting shortage of
power forced utility companies to initiate rolling blackouts such that blackouts were
intermittently shared across the whole area until sufficient power could be generated and
transmitted to the consumers (Amin, 2005; Apt et al., 2006). The last major power
fluctuation to discuss affected more than 50 million people, both within the U.S. and
Canada. The northeast blackout in 2003 was the most widespread and largest blackout in
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Figure 2. Comparison between Major Power Events and Regulator Efforts

history and was caused by numerous problems with failure to adhere to suggested
regulations (Lerner, 2003; Amin, 2005). The initial cause of the blackout was determined
to be human error and failure to properly trim trees around high-voltage power lines.
Power ultimately failed when a sagging high voltage transmission line grounded on an
overgrown tree, resulting in a domino effect of system failures throughout the northeast.
Completed investigations of outage causes often identify areas needing improvement and
ways to mitigate similar problems in the future.

Findings from the Identified Power Fluctuations
Investigations following large power fluctuations are among the best ways to
identify causes, examine total effects, and recommend solutions to prevent the problems
from occurring in the future. As with most technology today, 99.9 percent reliability is
increasingly unacceptable and can prove disastrous in the digital world (Amin, 2005;
Blankinship, 2001). Monetary losses are not the only effects felt by individuals from the
loss of power; in fact, public health and safety, institutions, and national security are all
affected by power loss and people’s lives and well-being can become severely
jeopardized (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2007). Bearing that in mind,
finding ways to avoid and minimize the spread of power outages is important for the
smooth operation of today’s society.
Among the different types of power outages, cascading are the most devastating
type as a single event can trigger a series of failures resulting in widespread blackouts.
Studies have found that there are two main types of cascading outages: an outage started
by a node removal or one that is started by an edge removal (Chassin & Posse, 2005; De
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la Ree, Liu, Mili, Phadke, & DaSilva, 2005). An example of a node removal would be
the malfunction of a transformer or substation which receives electricity from one
direction and sends it out along multiple paths. The second type, edge removal, can be as
simple as the loss of a single power line that carries current from one point to another.
Additionally, hidden failures can be the most troublesome since they are
permanent defects that only become evident during a failure and often times create larger,
more immediate problems (De la Ree et al., 2005). There is a general belief that paying
for reliable electricity should eliminate any type of power interruption (Brayley, Redfern,
& Bo, 2005). However, previous research has found that reliability has not improved as
electricity prices have increased, which is contrary to the desires of the consumer (Apt et
al., 2006; Hines et al., 2008). The 2003 blackout was initially started by the loss of a
single transmission line (edge removal) which caused other sections of the grid to
overload and shut down (node removal). These two types of power failures are not
mutually exclusive but can be initiated as a result of the other. What sometimes may be
thought of as a minor outage, can sometimes escalate into a much larger effect, over a
much larger area.
While blackouts have not shown a significant increase or decrease within the past
two decades, there appear to be trends that show a higher number of power outages
during the summer and winter months and also during mid-afternoon hours (Hines et al.,
2008). Currently, there is dissent with who is responsible for mitigating blackout
concerns and the best way to remedy the situation since no single entity manages
electricity from generation to the consumer. Specifically, with a decentralized system,
everyone is interested in their own assets, making it difficult for one organization to be
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blamed and held responsible for fixing the problems with the electric grid (Fox-Penner,
2005).
If no immediate actions are made to voluntarily increase the electric grid
reliability, the next major power failure could force power companies to make significant
improvements under a shortened timeline and at extremely high prices. As described by
Dobson (2007), “blackouts cause reliability.” Sometimes, it takes a larger power outage
to initiate needed reform once the consequences are observed, as opposed to being
preventative in nature.

Mitigation Efforts
Electricity has become a necessity in today’s society. This is becoming more and
more evident as each power outage brings some portion of society to a halt. As a result,
efforts at both the federal and local levels are being undertaken to reduce the overall
number of power fluctuations and increase overall power reliability.

Regulatory Evolution
In Amin’s (2005) study, the North American electric grid was referred to as the
“most complex machine ever built.” Within this structure are three components
responsible for connecting generation facilities to the actual consumer: (1) transmission
level, (2) sub-transmission level, and (3) distribution level (Baker, 2008). The
transmission level includes extra high voltage lines to transport electricity from the power
plants to electrical substations. Sub-transmission lines connect to the substations and
transport power to high voltage end-users such as manufacturing facilities or plants.
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Lastly, distribution lines disseminate power to end-users through low-voltage power
lines. Contrary to common belief, power does not move automatically through the bulk
power system; it takes a concerted effort by the utility companies. According to
McDonald (2008), utility companies have four main responsibilities to consumers: 1)
provide reliable electricity, 2) create a secure operating environment, 3) ensure continuity
for businesses, and 4) design plans for disaster preparedness and emergency management
response. Each of these components ensures power is present to consumers over 99% of
the time (Blankinship, 2001).

Involved Regulatory Organizations
Under the electric grid’s regulated structure, power is regulated by the FERC to
ensure the nation’s interstate transmission system operates efficiently while sub-agencies,
controlled by the state regulatory commissions, regulate the distribution system (U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, 2007). The addition of long-range transmission lines
connecting different geographic areas began creating problems with reliability and power
quality as they eventually became bottlenecks for power running long distances while
operating near maximum capacity.
In 1962, ten regional reliability councils, as shown in Figure 3, were established
to plan and coordinate generation and transmission in their regional areas (Apt et al.,
2006). Following the 1965 blackout in the Northeastern U.S., there was an apparent need
for additional oversight beyond what the regional reliability councils and FERC were
capable. As a result, the NERC was created to help reduce the risk of widespread electric
system failures by creating standards to improve compliance by electric utilities (Chassin
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& Posse, 2005; Lerner, 2003). Almost immediately, it became apparent that the
standards created by the NERC would face significant resistance because NERC was a
non-profit organization with no direct way to enforce the established standards, thereby
making compliance with their standards voluntary (U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, 2007; Brown, 2005).

Figure 3. NERC Regional Reliability Councils (About NERC, 2010)

In an effort to increase power reliability, FERC intended to break apart the
monopolies that utility companies managed within the deregulated power structure.
Consistent with FERC’s mission of “reliable, efficient and sustainable energy for
customers,” they planned to create a market economy where power was traded as a
commodity. It was anticipated that by FERC enforcing deregulation, power being traded
as a commodity would result in lower costs and more reliable power to the end-user.
With the passing of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) in 1978,
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wholesale competition was on the upturn, which was the first step towards a market
economy (Brown, 2005). PURPA essentially regulated the rates such that it was more
beneficial for electric utilities to buy power as opposed to making it.
The passing of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct 92) authorized the FERC to
break apart the vertical monopolies observed within the regulated electric grid.
Following EPAct 92, it took until 1996 to write the directives in FERC Order 888 which
allowed transmission line access to any generation facility (Baker, 2008; Lerner, 2003).
This broke apart vertical monopolies and allowed generation facilities to transmit their
power over any number of transmission lines. Figure 4 shows a visual representation of
how power can be moved from the power plants to the consumer. This is contrary to
what was shown earlier in Figure 1 where a single power company was responsible for
generating, transmitting, and distributing power to the consumer.

Figure 4. Post Deregulation Power System
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Attempted Deregulation and Results
Deregulation within the power grid exacerbated existing problems and brought
additional ones to the forefront. Restructuring has resulted in a rapid rate of wholesale
market expansion and a large variability in electricity prices among states (Mili et al.,
2004; Brown, 2005), sometimes without any apparent justification. Deregulation has also
resulted in decreased line reserve margins (extra capacity on power lines during normal
usage), redundancy, and quantity of spare parts while further increasing dependence on
transmission lines (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2007). In addition,
underinvestment in the electric supply infrastructure causes vulnerability within the
overcomplicated system to continue to rise as power is transported over longer distances
and results in more voltage sags (Anjia et al., 2006; Arrillaga et al., 2000; Baker, 2008).
These concerns undermine the motivation for today’s deregulated environment which
was “to create a stable state able to withstand exogenous events and profitably deliver
power to consumers” (Baker, 2008, p. 4).
Currently, only a limited number of states are currently operating the electric grid
with a deregulated system. The guidance provided by the FERC passed the responsibility
for the electric grid to the states such that they could make a decision regarding their
power structure. This allowed the states to determine whether or not it would be within
their best interests to deregulate their power structure or maintain control. Figure 5
displays the 50 states and structuring within each state. States identified as “Active”
currently have a deregulated electricity system. Areas identified as “Suspended” have
attempted deregulation but stopped after a multitude of complications occurred while the
remainder of the states are operating in a state regulated system.
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Figure 5. Current Status of Electricity Restructuring (EIA, 2009)

Factors Affecting Reliability
Whether investigating a regulated or deregulated grid, certain factors exist that
complicate concerns regarding the reliability and quality of power being delivered. For
instance, increased demand is stressing the grid and creating additional strain for which
the system was not designed. About one-half of all domestic generation is sold and
delivered over the stressed transmission lines (Baker, 2008; Albert, Albert, & Nakarado,
2004); therefore, unless changes are made, reliability and quality will continue to suffer.
Compounding the effects of the additional stress on the grid, dependability is often
favored at the expense of security (Mili et al., 2004). As shown in Figure 6, money spent
on the electric grid since 1996 has been insufficient to cover the depreciation of the
existing equipment. As a result, electric companies have invested to improve reliability
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by upgrading existing lines but have done little to protect against physical and cyber
problems. In addition, electric companies have opted to use otherwise vacant
transmission lines intended to provide necessary redundancy as opposed to expanding
current capacity.

Figure 6. Electric Grid Investment vs. Depreciation (Amin, 2005)

From a consumer perspective, all the changes occurring within the national power
grid have a direct effect on not only the power supplied but also the cost for the new and
improved power. Improvements will more than likely require either increases in utility
rates or government subsidies, which come from taxpayers. In conjunction with the rapid
deregulation, there has been a large decrease in new incentives to improve system
capacity, thereby making it difficult to market and implement technological advances
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(Hauer & Dagle, 1999; Baker, 2008). As a result, utility companies rely on the existing
infrastructure until an outage occurs and use the outage to identify both the
underinvestment and problems with the aging power grid (Fox-Penner, 2005).
Anjia et al. (2006) identified five threats affecting power grid reliability and
quality: (1) investment in power grid is insufficient, (2) impact of power industry
restructuring and the lack of sole responsibility for grid reliability, (3) tendency for
owners and operators to focus on a short-term, least-expensive operation approaches, (4)
cyber threats and physical threats of the grid, and (5) natural disasters and terrorism
threats. As mentioned earlier, deregulation favored utility companies using the existing
infrastructure as opposed to investing in new equipment. This essentially created a
decentralized web of blame as to who is responsible during outage events: are generation
companies responsible for power issues or the transmission companies that transport the
power? Similarly, companies are reluctant to spend money on long-term investments
because they are focused on handling immediate issues. However, as few improvements
are made to the existing system, the susceptibility to physical and cyber threats
continually increases (Mili et al., 2004; Bruce, 2002). (Bruce, 2002).
One of the major concerns regarding mitigation efforts of power fluctuations is
the idea that not enough is being done to secure the nation’s future energy needs.
Looking back at the regulatory changes within the electric grid, they have mainly focused
on widespread changes lacking specific guidelines as to what needs to be addressed.
Unfortunately, these changes must be made on such a large scale that complete
understanding and acceptance of what needs to be completed might be difficult. As a
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result, focused mitigation efforts need to be made to reduce the system deterioration and
force electric companies to abide by national guidelines.

National Level Mitigation Efforts
The literature tends to point to the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct 2005) as a
turning point when national attention was brought to bear on the electric grid’s problems
and a path was officially developed to help mitigate future problems (McDonald, 2008;
Abshier, 2007). According to the EPAct 2005, Congress delegated the authority to
approve and enforce rules affecting the reliability of the nation’s bulk power system to
the FERC in an effort to increase the reliability within the nation’s electric grid
(McDonald, 2008). As a result, the FERC certified the NERC as the Electric Reliability
Organization (ERO) providing full control for creating and enforcing reliability standards
for the nation’s bulk power system (Abshier, 2007). This newly appointed power
provided the NERC the ability to create standards and enforce policy affecting power
reliability of the different regional entities. As shown in Figure 7, the different NERC
regions cover a wide range of varying sizes with each having a completely different
population set. Prior to 2005, little effort was being expended within the nation’s bulk
power system to improve reliability since no single organization wielded the power to
enforce the developed standards.
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NERC REGION
Florida Reliability Coordination
Council (FRCC)
Midwest Reliability Organization
(MRO)
Northeast Power Coordinating
Council (NPCC)
ReliabilityFirst Corporation (RFC)
SERC Reliability
Corporation (SERC)
Southwest Power Pool (SPP)
Texas Regional Entity (TRE)
Western Electricity Coordinating
Council (WECC)

Total Size
(Square miles)

Peak Demand

Number of
Customers
(U.S. & Canada)

~ 50,000

45,734 MW

~ 16,000,000

~ 1,000,000

50,575 MW

~ 20,000,000

~ 1,200,000

109,798 MW

~ 55,000,000

~ 238,000

178,100 MW

~ 72,000,000

~ 560,000

202,738 MW

~ 68,000,000

~ 370,000
~ 200,000

44,463 MW
63,491 MW

~ 5,000,000
~ 22,000,000

~ 1,760,000

160,688 MW

~ 71,000,000

Figure 7. Power Outages by NERC Region (EIA, 2009)

Prior to 2005, oversight of the nation’s bulk power system was comprised of
voluntary organizations lacking authority to enforce any “suggested” reliability standards
(Abshier, 2007). Adherence to the developed standards were up to individual power
companies and violations went unpunished. Among the most problematic areas with the
electric grid is identifying who is responsible for bearing the costs to increase system
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reliability. One main area of concern is deciding how to estimate expenses needed for
improving the system. Brown (2005) estimated that improvements could cost as much as
$150 billion with little understanding as to who would be responsible for this tremendous
burden since companies were only responsible for a small section of the electric grid.
One major downfall of deregulation resulted in utility companies having little
desire to expand the system while operating existing lines closer to their capacity to
maximize their economic benefit (Arrillaga et al., 2000). Additionally, the existing
regional regulatory councils were more effective at responding to power issues as
opposed to managing the risks that preceded it (Hauer & Dagle, 1999). One final area of
concern that developed prior to 2005 was the need to strengthen the nation’s bulk power
system and the development of an improved response plan (Bruce, 2002).
EPAct 2005 created many ripples within the bulk electric system as the grid’s
mandatory reliability standards were developed within the NERC’s Critical Infrastructure
Protection (CIP) standards (Abshier, 2007; McDonald, 2008). These standards required
utility companies to take responsibility for their areas of the bulk electric systems in
North America or risk heavy fines until compliance was achieved. One of the CIP
standards required utility companies to identify and protect critical cyber assets
responsible for controlling the reliability of the whole system (McDonald, 2008). In
development for about three years, the CIP standards went beyond any existing guidance
and focused on both security and cyber issues in preparation for possible future problems
with the electric grid (McDonald, 2008; McClelland, 2009).
Initially, the NERC struggled to define what is actually considered critical
infrastructure but eventually came up with the following definition: “CIP includes
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facilities, systems and equipment which, if destroyed, degraded or otherwise rendered
unavailable, would affect the reliability or operability of the bulk electric system”
(McClelland, 2009). As defined by the NERC, this definition leaves room for
interpretation by utility companies regarding the actual definition of critical
infrastructure. Since the bulk power system is constantly changing, the application of the
new standards will limit flexibility and the ability to act decisively in case of an
emergency (McClelland, 2009). Finally, the standards that are being created do not
always tie directly into issues that are seen across the whole system and this can create
issues with enforcing standards if they are not necessarily applicable to each area (Shaw,
2009).
Looking beyond the problems with the CIP standards and the surrounding grid,
there appears to be some problems with the standards themselves. In particular, many of
the standards contained vague guidance which left a lot of room for utility companies to
interpret what they were actually required to do. If an asset is deemed critical in the
middle of assessments, no additional time is allotted to rectify the situation and bring the
asset into compliance (Mertz, 2008; McClelland, 2009). One area that the NERC left
extremely vague is describing “how” companies are to ensure compliance with the
standards. This vagueness creates much uncertainty when companies are trying to
adhere to the defined standards as they will be audited for compliance by NERC
according to their internal definition. These issues have raised additional concerns within
the electric grid and have resulted in less-than-acceptable actions.
Once the NERC released the CIP standards and dictated their timeline for
compliance, it was apparent little time was built into the schedule to reassess a
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company’s assets to determine their criticality. This in turn put a strain on the utility
companies to strive merely for compliance at the cost of possibly failing to adequately
secure their systems (Mertz, 2008). As a result, many utility companies are underreporting the number of critical assets that they own either through a failure to
acknowledge a component’s importance or intentionally calling it “non-critical” to avoid
future actions (Bradbury, 2009; Shaw, 2009). However, even though problems with
reliability of the nation’s bulk power system are being addressed at the national level,
there is an opportunity for consumers to protect their own investments and actually
decrease their likelihood of being effected by new and recurring power fluctuations.

Local Level Mitigation Efforts
Whereas mitigation efforts at the national level can be expensive and difficult to
coordinate, local efforts can be much less expensive and easier to implement. As with
most mitigation attempts, efforts are made to improve the system such that a fast
response can occur to prevent the cascading effects of power fluctuations and better
isolate problems (Amin, 2005). Consumers often feel they must protect their own assets
and invest in a wide range of technologies to help reduce their vulnerability to power
fluctuations. Items such as surge protectors, stand-by generators, or even battery backup
systems are all tools that help minimize the effects due to unforeseen power events. As
noted by LaCommare and Eto (2004), upwards of 3 cents of every manufacturing dollar
was spent annually on industrial equipment to address power fluctuation issues.
However, simply trying to mask the problem with a small-scale solution might not work
in the near-to-mid future (Masse et al., 2007).
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If a company relies solely on backup generators to power their facilities during
blackouts, unforeseen problems may arise regarding maintenance and continued
operations. For instance, a shortage of fuel or trained maintenance personnel might result
in a business being unable to supply their own power as they had only planned for shortduration outages. As a result, unknown external factors often alter an organization’s
plans, making it nearly impossible to be completely prepared for an unknown event with
an undetermined duration.
Although it is extremely difficult to plan for a completely new problem,
organizations can perform vulnerability assessments to determine where potential
weaknesses may exist within their current operations. Specifically, if a power fluctuation
were to occur from an outside source, how would it affect operations inside the company
and their customers? Once the results from the event are thoroughly understood, steps
must be taken to reduce associated risk, identify possible failing areas, develop the
response to the incident, and standardize the operating procedures (Anjia et al., 2006).
Instead of passively waiting for the utility companies to restore the grid, the DoD
has been developing detailed plans regarding procedures to be used during power
outages. The DoD, the nation’s largest single consumer of power, has a critical mission
that cannot wait for utility companies to restore power. As a result, backup plans exist
regarding power restoration to their critical infrastructure. Plans creating additional
power production capability have been initiated at multiple locations across the U.S.,
thereby allowing installations to isolate themselves from the grid through selfsustainment during instances of prolonged power outages. For instance, renewable
energy sources (i.e., geothermal, photovoltaic, and wind) and dedicated fossil fuel
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combustion plants are under construction, or have been completed, to provide sufficient
backup for installations during commercial blackouts (Aimone, 2009). Unfortunately
though, massive power generation support is not always economically feasible at all
locations. Therefore, installations must look at a smaller scale and their internal
capabilities to determine the best course of action that is both feasible and economically
beneficial.

Future Concerns
One of the most difficult areas to plan for regarding the power grid is the
uncertainty behind the demand for future power and any associated requirements. Within
the near future, external threats, fuel supply-line issues, and the possibility of cascading
failures will continue to be prominent and must have their needs adequately addressed.
External threats to the bulk power system, such as terrorists or natural disasters, are often
regarded as being able to bring down multiple areas of the system at one time (Amin,
2005). Although there is not a known successful attack by a terrorist on the power
system, the potential exists for multiple node failures resulting in widespread outages of
an unknown duration (Anjia et al., 2006). Natural disasters are another area that will
remain a large concern as the power system will be continuously tested by hurricanes,
tornadoes, earthquakes, and various weather events; additionally, scientists are also
becoming increasingly worried about the possible negative effects due to solar flares
from the sun. A severe solar flare has the possibility to not only bring down large areas
of the power system, but it can physically destroy transformers and other conductors due
to the large amount of induced current (McClelland, 2009). The effects from such a large

35

storm could last for weeks or longer since equipment would almost surely need
replacement due to permanent damage from the storm.
The possibility exists for prolonged power outages and only recently have these
concerns been brought to the forefront. Another future concern for the power grid is the
availability of a constant stream of fossil fuels required to run the generators powering
the U.S. Although most generators are operating from coal mined in the U.S., the
possibility exists for a break in the supply line. Such an event would have far reaching
effects, possibly requiring other plants to produce additional power until the offline plants
could be restored (Umstattd, 2009). The final area that is still a concern for the future is
the possibility for more cascading power failures. It is unclear whether the NERC’s CIP
standards will decrease the possibility of cascading failures because major improvements
are needed to the power system as the effects from these fluctuations have such a
dramatic impact on our way of life (Watts, 2003).

Geographic Information Systems Analysis
Little research is available regarding GIS analysis and the electric grid. However,
within the past few years, the implementation of GIS as a method to analyze geospatially
referenced data has become increasingly popular; specifically, the importance of
analyzing spatial relationships between events and the corresponding system has become
apparent. This gives researchers tools to analyze more than point masses on a map while
allowing flexibility to determine intermediate values.
Uses for GIS typically include mapping some sort of geospatial and nongeospatial
data such that a visual representation of the data can be created (Shih et al., 2009). This
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provides a good visual representation of the information’s specific locations in order to
assess spatial relationships. Tools often used within ArcGIS for analyzing point data
typically rely on interpolation through one or more of the following common methods:
inverse distance weighted (IDW), splining, or kriging. Three studies in recent years have
investigated the implementation of ArcGIS and the different tools to analyze the available
information (Shih et al., 2009; Earls and Dixon, 2007; Karydas, Gitas, Koutsogiannaki,
Lydakis-Simantiris, & Silleos, 2009). The work by Earls and Dixon (2007) used
interpolation of rainfall to determine a more accurate representation through the use of
IDW, splining, and kriging. Karydas et al. (2009) utilized interpolation to map the
topsoil characteristics within Crete. Lastly, Shih et al. (2009) investigated coal mine
disruptions to U.S. power generation facilities through the interpolation of available data.
The Earls and Dixon (2007) study intended to evaluate the different spatial
interpolation techniques (splining, inverse distance weighting, kriging) to determine if
one type was better for analyzing the available rain data for Charlie Creek, Florida.
Varying different parameters within the respective tools resulted in interpolated values of
varying accuracy when compared to the actual recorded data. However, for this
particular study, it was determined that kriging was the best alternative since the contours
followed the actual data more closely and did not lose small data points like the other
tools. Similarly, Karydas et al. (2009) investigated different interpolation tools, but
focused specifically on five common topsoil properties. In contrast to Earls and Dixon,
no specific interpolation tool was determined to be better over another since the provided
soil data did not demonstrate continuous trends. It was determined that fragmentation of
the land and availability of data points resulted in no tool being better than another. As a
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result, each study will have a specific tool that matches the dataset closely and it must be
analyzed to determine which tool is best in different situations.
The final study, Shih et al. (2009) went a step further than the two previous
studies by actually mapping the different components necessary to supply coal to power
plants and analyzed how an earthquake can have far-reaching effects. In fact, this study
merged geospatial and nongeospatial data such that a model could be created showing the
potential impacts of a disruption to one or more areas. This visual representation may not
identify specific causes and effects, but it helps estimate the potential impacts of a supply
shortage, due to an earthquake in this case, on power plants. In each of these studies, it is
important to realize that interpolation is a technique being used by more and more
researchers to analyze nongeospatial and geospatial data. However, depending on the
intent of the analysis, the interpolation tool will vary.

Management of Vulnerability
No matter the mitigation efforts at the national level, some level of vulnerability
for power fluctuations will always exist and it is up to the end-user to create adequate
management programs. As discussed in the previous section, EPAct 2005 is a step in the
right direction for improving the national power system. Unfortunately, it is anticipated
that changes will take an extended amount of time to implement and may need revisions
due to ever changing technology. In the meantime, vulnerability can be assessed and
managed at the user level such that some responsibility can be removed from the electric
companies and placed on the consumers. This in turn will make consumers better
prepared for future power fluctuations that might affect their operations.
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Vulnerability Defined
Whereas Merriam-Webster (2009) defines vulnerability as “open to attack or
damage,” there is much more involved when trying to understand the different intricacies
during power outages. When there is a loss within the nation’s power grid, there can
either be a partial loss in voltage (sag) or a complete loss of power resulting in a blackout
(or brownout). Most of the areas discussed thus far have been about complete blackouts,
yet the potential for power sags still exists and must also be addressed. The vulnerability
of the electric grid can be interpreted as the overall exposure that exists regarding an
attack on the electric grid (LaCommare & Eto, 2004). In recent years, the electric grid
has become increasingly vulnerable to physical attacks or even overloading of existing
power lines as reinvestment in the electric grid has been low (Mili et al., 2004).
However, adequate management of these vulnerabilities can help sustain mission
operations even during times of power fluctuations.

Vulnerability Assessment and Management
After determining the associated vulnerabilities throughout the power grid, it is
important to determine the specific level associated to the end-user. According to Anjia
et al., (2006), the purpose of a vulnerability assessment is to determine when a disruption
of service is likely to occur, take steps to reduce the associated risk, identify weak parts,
develop the response to the incident, enhance operator’s awareness, and standardize the
operation procedures. A vulnerability assessment can be performed in a number of
different ways to include the analysis of historical trends regarding outages and their
overall affects. The remainder of the steps identified by Anjia et al. (2006) are dependent

39

upon the situation and the available resources that locations have to help mitigate the
overall vulnerability. In fact, the USAF Infrastructure Energy Strategy (2008) mentions
specifics regarding the DoD’s vulnerability of power fluctuations at Air Force
installations.
Risk to critical missions at installations is a site-specific problem that is
being studied within the Air Force in concert with DoD, the DHS, and the
DOE, but the different parts of the problem are not yet integrated into a
comprehensive “get well” plan. We can reduce some of this mission risk
through conservation and expanded site-generated renewable energy. A
number of steps are required to ensure more resilient electrical and
logistics fuel systems support at Air Force installations: Energy must be
included in Air Force Critical Infrastructure Program plans, studied during
Vulnerability Assessments, exercised during base response activities, and,
ultimately, incorporated into full-spectrum operational planning to fully
observe and consider the potential deleterious effects.
The Air Force is working to determine an associated level of vulnerability at their
installations but needs complete integration of information from other Department of
Energy, Department of Homeland Security, and DoD entities. Whatever tool the enduser decides to implement, vulnerability will only be adequately managed if there is a
system in place that keeps reiterating the importance of what is being done. Whether it is
incentive based or otherwise, individuals need to be reminded that they can make a
difference in managing a much larger vulnerability.
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Chapter 3. Methodology

This chapter explains the unique methodology used to analyze historical power
outage data and the potential impacts on Air Force installations. Through the data
collection and analysis, an awareness tool was created to help properly identify an
installation’s vulnerability to future power outages. Information collected from the
Energy Information Administration (EIA) was imported and analyzed with a geographic
information system (GIS) software, ArcGIS, to determine the geographic locations of
historical power outages and their proximity to Air Force installations. The main tool
utilized within the ArcGIS was the inverse distance weighted (IDW) methodology, which
interpolates the value between data points to create contour maps. The information
developed from the GIS analysis provided historical trends for power outages based on
duration, number of customers affected, and total power loss. The combination of these
three maps using the raster calculator in ArcGIS, creates an overall vulnerability map for
the different regions of the United States (U.S.) as shown in Figure 8.

Data Source
Utilizing GIS to analyze power outages is an innovative approach compared to
traditional statistical analysis often used to determine historical trends (Hines et al., 2008;
Mili et al., 2004). In fact, this approach needs three important types of data (duration,
number of people affected, and power loss) to successfully perform the spatial analysis.
Collecting and scrubbing the information about power outages was the first step that
needed to be completed before being able to analyze the data. Although the EIA’s
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database contained a large volume of information, some data were found to be either
missing or incorrect. In particular, since the formation of the database in January 2000,
many utility companies have changed names since they originally reported information.
Additionally, although the EIA forms require utility companies to report details regarding
the location of power outages, this information typically only identifies the equipment
affected and not the geographic location. As a result, it was important to be able to
interpolate the origins of the power outages and the areas affected. The addition of
spatial reference through latitude and longitude global positioning coordinates facilitates
interpolation within the GIS software.

Figure 8. Data Collection and Analysis Process
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Major Disturbances and Unusual Occurrences Data
Published research efforts analyzing the electric grid often rely on the Disturbance
Analysis Working Group (DAWG) database maintained by the North American Electric
Reliability Corporation (NERC). Although the DAWG database is fairly complete, its
major shortcomings include a lack of outage duration and no requirement for all outages
to be reported. Therefore, the analysis presented in this research used data obtained from
monthly Electric Disturbance Events summaries maintained by the EIA. The time period
for the data ranged from 1 January 2000 to 31 August 2009. The specific data fields
included in the analysis were the power loss (in Megawatts (MW)), number of people
affected, and duration of the power disturbance. Previous research had utilized these
same fields to perform their analysis, in addition to considering the time of day (Mili et
al., 2004; Hines et al., 2008; Savageau, 2004). (Savageau, 2004)
Over the past 10 years, the EIA has changed the forms utility companies use to
report outages. Therefore, the summaries are based on information obtained from
emergency incident and disturbance reports (EIA-417) prior to December 2008 and
electric emergency incidence and disturbance reports (OE-417) from December 2008 to
August 2009. Both forms, shown as Appendix A and B, respectively, require the same
information to be filed with the EIA’s Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy
Reliability (Defense Science Board Task Force, 2008). The EIA requires companies to
file an EIA-417 when one or more of the following conditions are met.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

Initiates 3 percent or more system voltage reduction
Disconnects circuits supplying over 100 megawatts of firm customer load
Issues a public appeal to the public for a voluntary reduction in electricity use
Has existing or anticipated fuel supply emergency situations
Suspects an act of sabotage or terrorism
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The OE-417 form is actually an alert notification to the Department of Energy (DOE)
regarding actual problems within the electric system; it can be also used to identify
potential concerns. However, the EIA does not record all power disturbances because the
reporting thresholds specified for the OE-417 are typically not applicable to smaller
utilities. In other words, the data does not include all power outages – only reported
power disturbances meeting the above criteria. As a result, the data represents events
with far larger customer impacts over a much wider service territory.
After it was determined that electric companies were required to report a power
outage, the timeliness of informing the EIA was determined by whether the event
constituted a ‘normal alert’ or an ‘emergency alert.’ The requirements for both alert
levels are described in Table 1. For ‘emergency alerts,’ utility companies are required to
complete the OE-417 within an hour of the event and must follow-up as circumstances
change. In addition, for events classified as ‘normal alerts,’ utility companies must
complete the OE-417 within 6 hours of the incident and follow-up with any change in the
outage. Both alerts require the reporting company to submit a final form to the EIA
within 48 hours detailing as much information as possible regarding the power outage.
As was briefly discussed, both the EIA and DAWG databases lacked specific
detailed information about the location of the people affected and the origin of the
original power incident. EIA’s OE-417 (Appendix A) requires utility companies to
report the origin of the power outage within their service area, but this information is
“protected” and not readily available for analysis as it details significant failure points
within the nation’s power grid. The specifics regarding what is actually required can be
found in Schedule 2 of the OE-417 (Appendix B).
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Normal Alert

Emergency Alert

Table 1. EIA Alert Reporting Guidance (Form OE-417)
[ ] Actual physical attack that causes major interruptions or impacts to critical infrastructure
facilities or to operations
[ ] Actual cyber or communications attack that causes major interruptions of electrical
system operations
[ ] Complete operational failure or shut-down of the transmission and/or distribution
electrical system
[ ] Electrical System Separation (Islanding) where part or parts of a power grid remain(s)
operational in an otherwise blacked out area or within the partial failure of an integrated
electrical system
[ ] Uncontrolled loss of 300 Megawatts or more of firm system loads for more than 15
minutes from a single incident
[ ] Load shedding of 100 Megawatts or more implemented under emergency operational
policy
[ ] System-wide voltage reductions of 3 percent or more
[ ] Public appeal to reduce the use of electricity for purposes of maintaining the continuity of
the electric power system
[ ] Suspected physical attacks that could impact electric power system adequacy or
reliability; or vandalism which target components of any security systems
[ ] Suspected cyber or communications attacks that could impact electric power system
adequacy or vulnerability
[ ] Loss of electric service to more than 50,000 customers for 1 hour or more
[ ] Fuel supply emergencies that could impact electric power system adequacy or reliability

Geospatially Referenced Layers
The second data collection involved the integration of pre-made layer files into a
consolidated map showing U.S. boundaries and the location of military installations.
Within ArcGIS, layers are defined as a collection of components that are projected over
other components and can be manipulated separately from other layers. For the purposes
of this analysis, the coordinate system that was used was an industry standard, the
geographic coordinate system world geodetic system 1984 (GCS WGS 1984). The data
layers for Air Force installations and states were collected from the online National Atlas
(U.S. Department of the Interior, 2009), which replaced the original paper-bound version
of this service for maps of the U.S. Two layer files were subsequently used, one layer
showing all military installations and another showing state boundaries. Since the focus
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of this analysis strictly pertained to Air Force installations, all other military installations
were removed from the layer. The incorporation of these two layers with data collected
from the EIA’s database aggregated all the information necessary to analyze and assess
an Air Force installation’s vulnerability to power outages.

Data Adjustment
The main objective of the data collection effort was to assess historical power
outage data and determine if individual Air Force installations appear to be susceptible
(or vulnerable) to certain types of power outages, to include overall duration and number
of customers affected. As is the case with receiving third party information, it does not
always contain all the necessary components to easily perform the desired analysis. In
this instance, much of the data received from the EIA, through the EO-417 and EIA-417
forms, needed to be adjusted such that it could be analyzed within ArcGIS. In addition, it
was necessary to attach spatial references to each power outage, which was performed in
conjunction with the validation of current electric companies and renaming ones that
have since merged. The final database is found in Appendix C.

Power Outage Company Identification Adjustment
Utility companies are required to report a great deal of information on the EIA417 and OE-417 forms, including the name of the power company responsible for the
outage and the NERC region to which they belong. However, many of the companies
were found to no longer exist; they were either sold, merged with other companies, or
simply went bankrupt. As a result, it was important to create a consolidated list of
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existing companies and their respective areas of responsibility. For instance, if company
X reported an outage in March 2005 and merged with corporation Y in 2008, corporation
Y would assume responsibility for all reported outages by company X. Once a
consolidated list of existing power companies was created, it was necessary to determine
the service areas for each power company and the centroid of their area of responsibility.
An example of this is shown in Figure 9 for a gas and electric service provider in South
Carolina. Following one of the study’s original assumptions, the information for each
power outage is applied at the center of each power company’s service area. The
resulting center (or centroid) is based on the geographic location of the electric service
provider’s service area.

Figure 9. Example Centroid of Electric Service Area (SCE&G, 2010)
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By searching each utility company’s website, it was possible to determine their
service area and then use a global coordinate system to determine the centroid of the area
of responsibility. This information was then incorporated into the spreadsheet containing
the EIA’s power outages. The inclusion of this information allows for spatial analysis
within GIS to be performed. However, it was necessary to polish the data from the EIA
to remove data points that were missing information and ensure that all the reported data
was in a consistent format.

EIA Database Adjustment
At this point in the process, the spreadsheet contains the names of the updated
power companies and their spatial coordinates; however, the remainder of the
information needed to be standardized. Of the initial 720 records in the database, 234
were missing at least one of the identified attributes and 43 were outside the continental
U.S. Eliminating these records resulted in a total of 443 data records to be analyzed.
Within the remaining data, it was important to ensure that the fields for power loss,
number of people affected, and duration each used a standardized format. Otherwise, an
extraneous value that was either too large or small could bias the analysis. Upon
importing the information from the spreadsheets into ArcGIS, it was important to remove
any special formatting in the database. This was required since the spreadsheet software
and GIS do not always interpret formulas and formatting the same. The remaining
modifications included simple formatting within the spreadsheet program. Once the
adjustments of the EIA’s database were complete, the data analysis could proceed.
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Data Analysis
Before conducting spatial analysis, the data was examined for any trends in either
the number or magnitude of power outages from January 2000 to August 2009. Caution
must be used with these trend plots since the charts represent the number of reported
outages and not the actual number of outages. However, the incorporation of geospatial
analysis through GIS can provide a much more detailed picture displaying the impacts of
power outages on surrounding communities. To analyze the data with ArcGIS, the IDW
method was used with each of the three separate components (power loss, number of
people affected, and duration). Using the raster calculator in ArcGIS, the three layers
were compiled into an overall vulnerability contour map showing different levels across
the continental U.S.
To investigate the vulnerability of Air Force installations to different types of
power outages, the Spatial Analyst Tools in the ArcGIS software from the Environmental
Systems Research Institute, Inc. (ESRI), were used to perform spatial interpolation of the
data. As part of the initial setup, it was necessary to ensure that the coordinate system of
all layers and the imported EIA data records were consistent with the GCS WGS 1984
format. The next step was to create a personal geodatabase (GDB) file, which is an
object-oriented graphic database that allows all information contained within the map file
to be consolidated in one central location. Typically, if information is added from
random places, the map simply uses these references to refer to the information. As a
result, if the information was moved or deleted, the different map components would
need to be re-referenced before being displayed correctly. Where this comes in handy is
if the map were to move from one computer to another computer; each referenced layer
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would only have to be referenced back to one location as opposed to searching for all the
scattered components. The creation of the personal GDB file, in conjunction with setting
up the layers with uniform coordinate systems, puts the information into a format where
it can now be analyzed.
The ability to analyze data with GIS software ultimately depends on the
anticipated results and the type of outcome expected. As defined by Childs (2004),
procedures involving interpolation determine values on a surface between sampled
points. As displayed in Table 2, there are multiple interpolation tools available within
ArcGIS. However, the IDW tool provided the best option, when comparing the different
options in Table 2, since it allows flexibility to weight closer data points more heavily
than those far away. The Spatial Analyst Tools, and specifically IDW, focus on the use
of deterministic approaches to estimate “cell values by averaging the values of sample
data points in the neighborhood of each processing cell” (ESRI, 2007).

Table 2. Interpolation Tools within ESRI ArcGIS (ESRI, 2006)
TYPE
IDW
Spline
Trend
Kriging
Natural
Neighbor
Topo to Raster

DESCRIPTION
Interpolates a surface from points using an inverse distance weighted
technique
Interpolates a surface from points using a minimum curvature spline
technique
Interpolates a surface from points using a trend technique
Interpolates a grid from a set of points using kriging
Interpolates a surface from points using a natural neighbor technique
Interpolates a hydrologically correct surface from point, line, and
polygon data.
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Since power outages are scattered across the U.S., it is important to be able to
interpolate between observed points to determine an Air Force installation’s vulnerability
to power outages. According to Tobler’s Law (Tobler, 1970), “everything is related to
everything else, but near things are more related than distant things.” This concept is the
premise behind IDW analysis, which states that points closer to a central node (i.e., an
Air Force installation) will affect the node more than points farther away, even though
the points may be larger. In other words, power outages closer to a base are more likely
to affect the base than those far away. The IDW method was performed by calculating
values based on a variable radius determined by the closest 12 points. Interpolating
through IDW was performed on the individual power outage points in relation to Air
Force installations as shown in Figure 10.

Figure 10. IDW for a Sample set of Air Force Installations
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The search radii, in conjunction with power, were two components that had the
largest impact on the overall IDW results. In Figure 10, the different radius diameters are
dependent on the number of power outages in the surrounding area such that each circle
includes 12 power outages. For instance, the base in Ohio has the smallest circle since 12
power outages were in closer proximity than the base found in Tennessee, which has a
much larger circle. It can be interpreted that the smaller a circle, the higher the apparent
concentration of power outages surrounding the base. A higher power value created a
larger emphasis on the nearest points which in turn would create more detail on the final
map.
Elaborating further with Figure 11, IDW utilizes a technique called Shepard’s Method to
interpolate values of data points based on existing data. Equation 1 states that the
magnitude at (x,y) is equal to the summation of all surrounding points at some particular
weight (wi). The weight is further defined in Equation 2 as the distance between the
known data point and the value to be determined at (x,y) raised to a negative power.
Throughout this model, the power (p) was determined to be 2, which is the default value
in both Shepard’s Method and ArcGIS IDW interpolation. Equation 3 defines the actual
distance between the known data points and areas being interpolated. Finally, Equation 4
is the combination of Equations 1 through 3 which calculates the magnitude of the
interpolated data points. The combination of these three equations fully defines
Shepard’s Method for interpolating unknown values. In ArcGIS, these equations are
hidden from the user and the only values that must be entered are n, the number of data
points to be considered, and the power, p. For both n and p, the default values (12 and 2,
respectively) were chosen as a starting point for the analysis. The rest of the analysis is
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automatically performed and the results are produced as a raster file which can be further
analyzed.

Figure 11. Inverse Distance Weighted Model (ESRI, 2007)

,
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F(x,y) = Unknown magnitude at unknown point (x,y)
(xi, yi) = Point with known magnitude
fi = known magnitude at point (xi, yi)
wi = weighted value of point (xi, yi) on (x, y)
hi = distance from point (xi, yi) to (x, y)
p = power (or effect) that point (xi, yi) has on (x, y) (2 is the default)
n = number of points (12 is the default)

53

(4)

GIS Data Analysis and Model Development
IDW can now be performed in ArcGIS using the guidelines described in the
Procedural Log developed for this research and shown in Appendix D. The first step is to
perform an IDW for each of the three previously identified components: duration, power
loss (in MW), and number of people affected. The output was a contour map for each
component across the U.S. Individually, these created layers do not tell the complete
story; when combined into a single contour map though, they reveal the vulnerability of
areas based on varying levels of outage durations, power loss, and number of people
affected.
To properly compile the three layers, it was important to first normalize, or
somehow standardize, the information across the three layers. This is important because
if the data from the three layers is simply added, the number of people affected will
completely dominate the output results. The reason behind this assumption is the units:
the number of people affected is in the millions, while both the power loss and duration
are in the hundreds. In addition, all three components are necessary to be compiled since
the three components are not directly related to one another. In some instances, a power
outage that has a high power loss might affect a large group of people; however, this is
not always true. For instance, industry can dominate power consumption even though it
typically represents only a small population. This led to the development of the
following equation to determine vulnerability.
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(5)
N = Total number of people affected
NMAX = Maximum value for number of people affected
M = Megawatt loss
MMAX = Maximum value for megawatt loss
D = Duration
DMAX = Maximum value for duration

Using Equation 5, the three layers are individually normalized such that the resulting
values range from 0 to 1 (with 0 being no effect and 1 having the largest effect). The
numerators of the terms in the equation represent all values calculated within the
respective layers through IDW interpolation, whereas the denominators are the maximum
value for each respective layer.
The incorporation of the above equations in ArcGIS is accomplished using the
raster calculator. This tool allows different components to be aggregated into a single
layer. Once Equation 1 is used in the raster calculator, the output is a contour map
showing the vulnerability of regions in the U.S. to power outages. The output is a unitless map with associated vulnerabilities based on the weights described in Equation 2.
Within the map are contour levels showing areas with a low and high vulnerability index
such that areas with lower levels are less likely to be impacted by large-scale power
outages; whereas, in areas with a high vulnerability index, they are more likely to be
impacted by a large-scale power outage. Each base falls within a region on the map and
therefore a value, based on the calculated vulnerability layer, can be determined for each
Air Force installation.
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Summary
The objective of this study was to develop a model for assessing the level of
vulnerability for Air Force installations based on power outages from 2000 to 2009 in the
EIA database. Scrubbing the data and putting it in the same format, along with using the
same coordinate system, was required prior to analyzing the point masses. IDW and the
raster calculator were used in ArcGIS to determine the associated levels of vulnerability
for Air Force installations. These results then provided what is called the level of
vulnerability, ranging from low to high, which installations can use as a basis to
investigate mitigation efforts.
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Chapter 4. Results and Analysis

Existing literature has a void regarding research on power outages in the United
States (U.S.) and the effects from their spatial relationship to surrounding communities.
The focus of this thesis was to examine the effects of power outages on Air Force
installations by analyzing the Energy Information Administration’s (EIA) power outage
database using both spreadsheet software and ArcGIS. Previous research has focused
strictly on the statistical analysis of existing power outage databases to investigate trends
and correlations. Analysis for this thesis began by utilizing spreadsheet software to
determine trends in the EIA’s database, to include different North American Electric
Reliability Corporation (NERC) regions which might be a predictor of the anticipated
results discovered from ArcGIS. The main approach used in this study was the inverse
distance weighted (IDW) method to examine the EIA’s power outage data points for
megawatt (MW) loss, number of people affected, and duration for the individual points
from January 2000 to August 2009. Although the nation’s grid is connected to Canada,
and NERC regions extend to Canada, the focus of this analysis is strictly limited to the
continental U.S. and the effects felt therein.

Initial Results
A large number of data points from the EIA’s power outage database were
missing one or more of the following components: MW loss, number of affected
customers, and total duration. Of the original 720 data points from the EIA’s database,
only 443 total points contained complete records and were subsequently used in the
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analysis. Additionally, some data points had incorrect information, to include utility
company names that no longer existed. A significant search for older companies led to
the finding that many companies had merged into larger, present-day corporations.
Although this might create some discrepancies within the final analysis, it is important to
group the companies together such that the analysis could be performed within both the
spreadsheet software and ArcGIS.
Initial analysis of the EIA’s power outage database involved the utilization of
spreadsheet software to graph different outage characteristics (duration, number affected,
power loss) from January 2000 to September 2009. Figures 12 through 14 represent
categorized charts of the different outage characteristics. No trends are apparent in any
of the charts, yet it is apparent that between 2002 and 2003, there is a sizable jump in
reported data. The next analysis strove to investigate the number of reported outages per
year since January 2000. As shown in Figure 15, it is readily apparent that there are two
distinct time periods within the specified timeframe, one from 2000 to 2002 and the other
from 2003 to 2009. Within each time period, the number of outages is relatively
consistent (except for the anomaly in 2008). It is unclear what caused the increase in
outages between the two time periods; similarly, there is insufficient information to
explain why reported power outages remained higher in the 2003 to 2009 time period.
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Figure 12. Categorized Power Outages by Duration
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Figure 13. Categorized Power Outages by Number Affected
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Figure 14. Categorized Power Outages by Power Loss
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Figure 15. Total Power Outages by Year

The number of reported outages can be further broken down into the different
NERC regions, power companies, and causes of disturbances. It is important to
investigate the origin of the outages to be able to determine if there are any patterns
involving regional power reliability or even a significant impact due to natural disasters.
First, it is important to understand that although the different NERC regional entities can
be compared on paper, the fact of the matter is that their size and population they serve
vary greatly. However, further investigation of any possible regional trends might
provide good insight regarding possible problems within a specific area. As shown in
Figure 16, the NERC regions experienced an unequal amount of power outages. It is
interesting to note that while some NERC regions (e.g., SPP, MRO, FRCC) experienced
a fairly consistent number of outages, other regions (e.g., WECC, RFC, NPCC) had a
sizeable increase in reported outages from January 2000 to August 2009.
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Figure 16. Power Outages by NERC Regions (EIA, 2009)

Without additional research, it is difficult to fully address why some regions
experienced a sudden jump in power outages. Referencing Figure 16, it is possible to
make the determination that over the past 10 years, some NERC regions had little to no
gain in the number of power outages while other areas displayed a constant, annual
increase in the number of outages. For instance, California and the Western U.S.
(WECC) have experienced many disturbances in recent years that have had a widespread
impact and have occurred more frequently than in past years.
In addition to examining trends in the number of power outages, it is also possible
to investigate if there are any trends in the reported causes of the power outages. As
shown in Figure 17, there were 13 different categories of causes for reported power
outages. No immediate observations can be made regarding the different types of power
outages except the fact that nature tends to be the source of most power outages.
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Information supporting the justification for why the outages caused by natural events are
the highest cannot be specifically determined since it could be for a multitude of reasons.
However, the nation’s electric grid might be increasingly susceptible to repeated abuse by
nature and the lack of adequate preventive maintenance is causing additional numbers of
power outages. Another interpretation of Figure 17 could be that no matter how much
preventative maintenance is performed, natural events are still going to occur at random
and have a significant impact on the ability to supply power. From the literature review
in Chapter 2 though, this is unlikely since power companies have spent little money on
the existing grid while operating it as close to maximum capacity as possible. This in
turn makes it easier for an otherwise small event to have a much larger impact. Although
insights can be gained from trend analysis, more detailed analysis is necessary.

Intermediate Results
The initial part of this research involved simply charting the EIA’s electrical
disturbance database to determine any types of trends that might exist. This section takes
the next step by performing interpolation of the three separate data categories (duration,
number of people affected and MW loss). As was discussed in the literature review, the
nation’s electric grid has evolved such that it is heavily interconnected and there exists a
large potential for more widespread power outages. This is the premise behind the use of
IDW for the electric grid since what might happen in one area could permeate to other
areas through the web of wires connecting the electric grid.
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Figure 17. Power Outage Disturbances by Type (EIA, 2009)

The results described herein take the next step in analysis by performing
interpolation on the available data points to create a contour map reflecting vulnerability.
Through the analysis of the three data categories, it was possible to create an overall
vulnerability map compiling these different components. Categories were created for the
specific components, ranging from green to red scales as shown in Table 3, to allow the
interpolated layers to be interpreted based on related data.

Table 3. Categorized Outage Components

Green (A)
Teal (B)
Yellow (C)
Orange (D)
Red (E)

MW Loss
< 300
300 – 600
600 – 1,000
1,000 – 2,000
> 2,000

Number Affected
< 100,000
100,000 – 200,000
200,000 – 300,000
300,000 – 600,000
> 600,000

Duration (Hours)
< 24
24 – 72
72 – 120
120 – 192
> 192

Vulnerability Index
< 0.25
0.25 – 0.5
0.5 – 0.75
0.75 – 1
>1

The categories for the megawatt loss were grouped based on actual power plant
sizes found within the U.S. For instance, of the 5,336 generators supplying power within
the U.S., 81% produced power less than 300 MW, 7% produced power ranging from 300
to 600 MW, 5% produced power ranging from 600 to 1,000 MW, 5% produced power
ranging from 1,000 to 2,000 MW, and 2% produced power greater than 2,000 MW.
Similarly, population categories were determined from the 2000 U.S. census. For this
category, 81% of U.S. counties have a population less than 100,000; 9% have a
population between 100,000 and 200,000; 3% have a population between 200,000 and
300,000; 4% have a population between 300,000 and 600,000; and 3% have a population
in excess of 600,000. For the power outage duration, the EIA database was used to group
outage durations in similar categories. Accordingly, 55% of the outages had a duration
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less than 24 hours, 22% had a duration between 24 and 72 hours, 9% had a duration
between 72 and 120 hours, 7% had a duration between 120 and 192 hours, and 7% had a
duration greater than 192 hours. These categories allow for bases to be categorized
according to the ranges specified in Table 3.
The last column in Table 3 shows the vulnerability index classifications as it was
calculated for this particular study. Based on Equation 5, it is important to keep in mind
that the highest vulnerability index that could be calculated would theoretically be 3.
This would be considered the worst case scenario where the maximum number of people
are effected with the largest power loss and for the longest duration. However, the ranges
in this study were found to range from 0 to 1.83. This implies that the largest value in
one category did not always translate into the largest value in another category. In order
to determine the specific categorical breaks, a natural break option within ArcGIS was
utilized to create the best group of similar values which maximizes the difference
between the groups. As shown by the different break points in Table 3, the vulnerability
index levels are categorized for bases using the following descriptions.


Green (A) Level – Installations have a chance to experience a widespread
power outage lasting a short duration



Teal (B) Level – Installations have a chance to experience a small scale power
outage lasting less than two days.



Yellow (C) Level – Installations have a chance to experience a mid-size
power outage lasting upwards of four days.



Orange (D) Level – Installations have a chance to experience a large power
outage lasting upwards of a week.



Red (E) Level – Installations have an chance to experience a catastrophic
power outage lasting more than one week.
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Inverse Distance Weighted for Number of People Affected
The number of people that a power disturbance actually affects depends on the
utility company’s best guess as to the total number of homes affected. Upon initial
reporting, companies are required to submit an estimate for the total number of people
affected; however, if the outage is widespread, or conversely, isolated, the exact number
of individuals affected can vary significantly. As a result, the total number of people
affected by the power outage tends to align with both the duration and magnitude (in
MW) of the power disturbance. However, the higher the number of people affected,
typically the wider the area impacted by the actual outage. This was evident in the
northeast blackout of 2003, when approximately 50 million people were affected across
multiple states for an extended amount of time.
The first analysis performed IDW on the number of people affected by power
outages as shown in Figure 18. Additional figures are provided in Appendix E showing a
more detailed view of the IDW analysis for the number of people affected. The proper
way to interpret Figure 18 is that based on historical power outages, areas in red would
have experienced outages that affected more than 600,000 people. As it pertains to the
Air Force, there are some installations that find themselves within the “hot zone,” where
more people have technically been affected. As shown in Table 4, Little Rock AFB, Los
Angeles AFB, Tinker AFB, and Vance AFB have all experienced outages affecting more
than 600,000 people. This is a weighted collection over the past decade such that there
might have been a large amount of small outages around the bases or simply a few large
outages that had a very large impact. Either way, bases that are shown as being in either
the orange or red categories have experienced outages totaling the highest in the nation.
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(A)
(B)
(C)
(D)
(E)

Figure 18. Calculated IDW for Number Affected

Table 4. Calculated IDW of Number of People Affected for Air Force Installations
Number
Affected

FULLNAME
Altus AFB

C

Andrews AFB

B

Arnold AFB

Number
Affected

264,371

FULLNAME
Hanscom AFB

C

124,079

Hill AFB

A

C

217,659

Holloman AFB

Barksdale AFB

D

350,195

Beale AFB

B

115,465

Bolling AFB

B

Buckley AFB

Number
Affected

220,442

FULLNAME
Moody AFB

B

82,519

Mountain Home AFB

A

37,141

B

199,341

Nellis AFB

B

136,155

Hurlburt Fld

B

116,088

Offutt AFB

B

122,956

Keesler AFB

C

200,000

Patrick AFB

B

196,924

148,516

Kirtland AFB

D

402,893

Peterson AFB

B

124,628

B

125,064

Lackland AFB

B

163,511

Pope AFB

B

105,149

Cannon AFB

A

23,774

Langley AFB

B

108,650

Randolph AFB

B

138,498

Charleston AFB

B

142,870

Laughlin AFB

B

190,901

Robins AFB

B

133,704

Columbus AFB

C

255,011

Little Rock AFB

E

1,418,436

Scott AFB

A

71,228

Creech AFB

B

139,430

Los Angeles AFB

E

850,400

Seymour Johnson AFB

B

101,857
137,264

153,806

Davis- Monthan AFB

A

40,950

Luke AFB

B

106,151

Shaw AFB

B

Dover AFB

B

113,662

Macdill AFB

C

255,096

Sheppard AFB

D

386,399

Dyess AFB

B

168,562

Malmstrom AFB

A

61,763

Tinker AFB

E

1,660,047

Edwards AFB

D

400,411

Maxwell AFB

A

85,197

Travis AFB

A

72,402

Eglin AFB

B

113,105

Maxwell (Gunter) AFB

A

84,448

Tyndall AFB

B

124,403

Ellsworth AFB

B

126,094

McChord AFB

A

81,442

Vance AFB

E

1,201,370

F E Warren AFB

A

96,672

McConnell AFB

D

481,009

Vandenberg AFB

C

240,031

Fairchild AFB

A

80,391

McGuire AFB

A

76,587

Whiteman AFB

C

251,038

Goodfellow AFB

B

142,972

Minot AFB

A

47,157

Wright-Patterson AFB

B

122,554

Grand Forks AFB

A

28,169

*NOTE: Letter designations correspond to color codes in Figure 18.
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Inverse Distance Weighted for Total Hours Lost
The total duration of the reported power outages has a large impact on the
consumer’s ability to successfully operate. In terms of power outage duration, there are
two main factors to consider: 1) repeated power outages of short duration and 2) longterm, sustained power outages. As was previously discussed with the EIA database,
power outages are not required to be reported unless 50,000 or more people are affected
for greater than one hour. As such, momentary outages, or outages lasting only minutes,
often go unreported by utility companies unless they must be reported based on meeting
other criteria. As a result, the categorical values in Table 5 were based on the premise
that long-term outages are much worse than shorter outages. In some instances, if a
power outage is very widespread, there are instances where some consumers have power
restored almost immediately, whereas others are left without power for days or even
weeks.
As shown in Figure 19, a great deal of the U.S. has experienced power outages
totaling more than 72 hours over the past decade. A more detailed view of Figure 19 is
displayed in Appendix F. When utility companies file OE-417 (or EIA-417 prior to
2008), they are required to report the final time that power was restored to all users.
Whether or not the utility companies actually reported the data correctly, outages for over
a week, or even five to seven days, represent a significant amount of time to be without
power. As shown in Table 5, only Macdill AFB was classified in the category for
outages in excess of 192 hours; however, there were an additional 18 bases scattered
through the U.S. that have experienced power failure lasting between 72 to 192 hours.
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(A)
(B)
(C)
(D)
(E)

Figure 19. Calculated IDW for Total Duration

Table 5. Calculated IDW of Total Duration for Air Force Installations
FULLNAME
Altus AFB

B

34

FULLNAME
Hanscom AFB

A

4

FULLNAME
Moody AFB

C

Andrews AFB

C

95

Hill AFB

C

103

Mountain Home AFB

A

8

Arnold AFB

C

100

Holloman AFB

A

3

Nellis AFB

C

108

Barksdale AFB

D

173

Hurlburt Fld

C

78

Offutt AFB

A

7

Beale AFB

A

8

Keesler AFB

A

2

Patrick AFB

B

61

Duration

Duration

Duration
74

Bolling AFB

C

118

Kirtland AFB

A

5

Peterson AFB

B

45

Buckley AFB

B

47

Lackland AFB

B

31

Pope AFB

B

54

Cannon AFB

A

5

Langley AFB

B

48

Randolph AFB

B

26

Charleston AFB

B

59

Laughlin AFB

B

24

Robins AFB

B

26

Columbus AFB

C

88

Little Rock AFB

C

77

Scott AFB

C

79

Creech AFB

C

107

Los Angeles AFB

A

2

Seymour Johnson AFB

B

40
62

Davis- Monthan AFB

A

1

Luke AFB

A

6

Shaw AFB

B

Dover AFB

B

67

Macdill AFB

E

197

Sheppard AFB

B

51

Dyess AFB

A

14

Malmstrom AFB

B

70

Tinker AFB

D

180

Edwards AFB

A

9

Maxwell AFB

B

37

Travis AFB

A

3

Eglin AFB

C

73

Maxwell (Gunter) AFB

B

35

Tyndall AFB

B

72

Ellsworth AFB

B

72

McChord AFB

B

46

Vance AFB

D

152

F E Warren AFB

B

48

McConnell AFB

D

156

Vandenberg AFB

A

12

Fairchild AFB

B

49

McGuire AFB

A

6

Whiteman AFB

C

105

Goodfellow AFB

A

10

Minot AFB

B

42

Wright-Patterson AFB

C

74

Grand Forks AFB

A

24

*NOTE: Letter designations correspond to color codes in Figure 19.
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Inverse Distance Weighted for Total Megawatts Lost
The total megawatt loss pertains to the amount of power not being supplied to
meet the customer’s demand. In other words, the megawatt loss can be directly tied to
either productivity service or inconvenience. The overall effect depends on the
requirements set out by the consumer. In fact, when individuals experience power loss, it
is not always a complete blackout; it can also be a brownout where insufficient power is
supplied. Sometimes this can be even more devastating for industry since lower voltages
can possibly damage equipment requiring a minimum standard to operate.
Unfortunately, similar to the other two components, there are stipulations that require a
utility company to report only on total megawatt loss resulting from an uncontrollable
loss of at least 300 megawatts for more than 15 minutes. As a result, outages not meeting
this threshold go unreported, even though they could have potentially had a large impact.
As mentioned previously, the amount of power loss was categorized according to
the EIA’s database on available power generators across the U.S. Large outages mean
that more generators were affected by the drop in power; additionally, an increased strain
was placed on remaining generators as they tried to compensate for the power shortage.
After performing IDW for the power loss during the reported outages, the contour map
shown in Figure 20 was created. A more detailed view of Figure 20 can be found in
Appendix G. Only one base, Los Angeles AFB, fell within the high categorical range
whereas an additional 14 bases had experienced power loss greater than 600 MW. Table
6 shows the interpolated values as determined by the available power outage data and
IDW within ArcGIS. The remainder of the installations fell within the lower ranges
where power loss could be considered marginal.
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(A)
(B)
(C)
(D)
(E)

Figure 20. Calculated IDW for Power Loss

Table 6. Calculated IDW of Power Loss for Air Force Installations
FULLNAME
Altus AFB

B

305

FULLNAME
Hanscom AFB

B

456

FULLNAME
Moody AFB

C

Andrews AFB

D

1,093

683

Hill AFB

B

300

Mountain Home AFB

A

Arnold AFB

B

186

571

Holloman AFB

B

436

Nellis AFB

B

Barksdale AFB

422

A

276

Hurlburt Fld

B

482

Offutt AFB

C

629

Beale AFB

B

323

Keesler AFB

B

300

Patrick AFB

C

940

Bolling AFB

D

1,444

Kirtland AFB

C

869

Peterson AFB

A

239

Buckley AFB

A

242

Lackland AFB

A

223

Pope AFB

B

462

Cannon AFB

B

551

Langley AFB

B

488

Randolph AFB

A

189

Charleston AFB

B

573

Laughlin AFB

B

306

Robins AFB

D

1,896

Columbus AFB

A

296

Little Rock AFB

A

78

Scott AFB

A

277

Creech AFB

B

437

Los Angeles AFB

E

2,430

Seymour Johnson AFB

B

405

Davis- Monthan AFB

A

138

Luke AFB

B

403

Shaw AFB

B

567

Dover AFB

B

391

Macdill AFB

D

1,040

Sheppard AFB

B

324

Dyess AFB

B

306

Malmstrom AFB

B

437

Tinker AFB

B

473

Edwards AFB

D

1,111

Maxwell AFB

B

455

Travis AFB

A

161

Eglin AFB

B

475

Maxwell (Gunter) AFB

B

449

Tyndall AFB

B

491

Ellsworth AFB

C

737

McChord AFB

B

310

Vance AFB

B

456

F E Warren AFB

B

303

McConnell AFB

B

449

Vandenberg AFB

C

772

Fairchild AFB

B

435

McGuire AFB

A

215

Whiteman AFB

B

360

Goodfellow AFB

B

325

Minot AFB

C

982

Wright-Patterson AFB

C

970

Grand Forks AFB

C

991

MW Loss

MW Loss

*NOTE: Letter designations correspond to color codes in Figure 20.
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MW Loss

Final Results
The final step in performing the analysis for this thesis was compiling the
different layers into a consolidated vulnerability map, showing the weighted vulnerability
index. Defined in Chapter 3, Equation 4 utilized the maximum value found within each
component layer in an effort to transform the compiled elements into unit-less values
ranging between 0 and 1. As a result, the theoretical maximum value which could be
assessed within the consolidated analysis is 3; since the data categories for the
vulnerability index were shifted to the left though, the calculated vulnerabilities never
reached above 1.8 units. As a result, the vulnerability index categories were shifted to the
left, thereby providing a more realistic view of the interpolated data. The use of raster
calculation created the map in Figure 21 and Table 7, which displays the vulnerability
levels at Air Force installations. More detailed maps of Figure 21 are displayed in
Appendix H. It is important to understand these results do not mean that an area is more
susceptible to the extremes for each category: in other words, high vulnerability indices
do not mean that the area will experience power outages that affect a large number of
people, last for an extended duration, and have a high power loss.
There are only a few bases in categories at or above the average level (level C),
with most bases being in the lower range for more significant power outages. Tinker
AFB, located near Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, was the only base with a vulnerability
score greater than 1. This implies that the base, compared to the remainder of the U.S.
based on historical data, experiences power outages that have the largest impact. Seven
other bases are within the yellow and orange (0.5 to 1) groupings. Each of these bases
might consider evaluating their power generation capability to determine its adequacy.
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Figure 21. Calculated Weighted Vulnerability (Individual Outages)

Table 7. Calculated Vulnerability of Power Outages for Air Force Installations
Vulnerability
Index

FULLNAME
Altus AFB

A

Andrews AFB

B

Arnold AFB

Vulnerability
Index

0.22

FULLNAME
Hanscom AFB

A

0.40

Hill AFB

B

B

0.39

Holloman AFB

Barksdale AFB

C

0.59

Beale AFB

A

Bolling AFB

Vulnerability
Index

0.15

FULLNAME
Moody AFB

B

0.32

0.32

Mountain Home AFB

A

0.06

A

0.14

Nellis AFB

B

0.36

Hurlburt Fld

B

0.29

Offutt AFB

A

0.14

0.10

Keesler AFB

B

0.35

Patrick AFB

B

0.33

C

0.51

Kirtland AFB

B

0.27

Peterson AFB

A

0.19

Buckley AFB

A

0.19

Lackland AFB

A

0.17

Pope AFB

A

0.22

Cannon AFB

A

0.08

Langley AFB

A

0.21

Randolph AFB

A

0.14

Charleston AFB

B

0.26

Laughlin AFB

A

0.17

Robins AFB

B

0.33

Columbus AFB

B

0.35

Little Rock AFB

D

0.76

Scott AFB

A

0.25

Creech AFB

B

0.36

Los Angeles AFB

C

0.62

Seymour Johnson AFB

A

0.18

Davis- Monthan AFB

A

0.03

Luke AFB

A

0.10

Shaw AFB

B

0.27

Dover AFB

B

0.25

Macdill AFB

C

0.69

Sheppard AFB

B

0.31

Dyess AFB

A

0.14

Malmstrom AFB

A

0.24

Tinker AFB

E

1.15

Edwards AFB

B

0.30

Maxwell AFB

A

0.18

Travis AFB

A

0.05

Eglin AFB

B

0.28

Maxwell (Gunter) AFB

A

0.17

Tyndall AFB

B

0.28

Ellsworth AFB

B

0.31

McChord AFB

A

0.18

Vance AFB

D

0.90

F E Warren AFB

A

0.19

McConnell AFB

C

0.62

Vandenberg AFB

A

0.21

Fairchild AFB

A

0.20

McGuire AFB

A

0.07

Whiteman AFB

B

0.40

Goodfellow AFB

A

0.12

Minot AFB

A

0.23

Wright-Patterson AFB

B

0.34

Grand Forks AFB

A

0.18

*NOTE: Letter designations correspond to color codes in Figure 21.
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Summary
The consolidated vulnerability map created with ArcGIS is a good tool for Air
Force installations to use to interpret their vulnerability to power outages based on
historical data. Although interpolation is only a best guess for determining values
between existing data points, it provides a good baseline for bases to determine their
potential for future power outages. However, that is only part of the problem. Mitigation
plans must be developed to anticipate and prepare for future outages.
Power outages throughout the U.S. are going to continue into the future and,
according to Figure 16, are beginning to rise in certain geographic regions. As such, it is
important for Air Force installations to adequately address their own capabilities and act
upon these findings to secure their power for the future. Power failure is no excuse for
critical missions to be affected since national security could also be affected.
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Chapter 5. Conclusion

This research effort sought to analyze historical power outages reported to the
Energy Information Administration (EIA) to determine areas of variable vulnerability to
future power outages. These findings are the result of applying a new method to
investigate historical power outage data by analyzing them using spatial relationships.
One of the major assumptions supporting this approach has been the idea that the electric
grid is highly interconnected and events in one area could have a direct impact on
surrounding areas. The analysis of power outage data using ArcGIS allowed for the
creation of contour maps representing varying vulnerability levels. The previous chapter
discussed the findings and provided insight as to the vulnerability levels at Air Force
installations relating to varying levels of power outage duration, power loss, and number
of people affected. This chapter summarizes the findings from this research effort and
provides suggestions for future research.

Thesis Purpose
As previously identified in Chapter 1, the purpose of this thesis contained two
important components: the analysis of data to determine vulnerabilities and the
identification of mitigation efforts to reduce those vulnerabilities at Air Force
installations. This research aimed to investigate historical power outages by utilizing the
EIA’s unusual occurrence and disturbance database and focusing on information
regarding power outage loss, duration, and number of people affected. Utilizing a
handful of tools within ArcGIS, in conjunction with the location of the power companies
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responsible for the individual outages, it was possible to perform spatial analysis of the
areas affected by the outages. The results from this analysis provide critical information
necessary to determine overall levels of vulnerability for areas between the power
outages.
The second portion of this research concerns recommendations to mitigate
associated vulnerabilities. In contrast, one of the worst decisions to be made would be to
simply do nothing and hope the problem corrects itself. However, as it relates to the Air
Force, the consequence for inaction could result in an immediate threat to national
security. Therefore, three suggested actions must be considered: changing user
behaviors, investigating internal capacity, and negotiating special actions with the electric
company. Changing individual behaviors would result in immediate benefits as load
levels would decrease and on reserve margin would increase, thereby resulting in a
decreased chance for power outages in the near future.
Besides addressing individual behavior, the Air Force could initiate an
investigation to determine the availability of both personnel and equipment to manage
critical facilities during instances of prolonged power outages. The result could be that
some bases may have sufficient capacity for their critical facilities, as opposed to other
bases which might simply be lacking in adequate generation capability. As a result, Air
Force senior leadership could allocate additional resources to bases in higher
vulnerability categories if it is deemed a priority. This would help ensure that all Air
Force installations are prepared for future power outages.
The last suggestion for mitigation involves negotiating with electric companies
through one of two methods. The first approach involves changing existing contracts
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such that bases receive priority after power outages such that restoration efforts would be
focused on restoring power to military installations first. Since individual bases are not
experts regarding contract negotiations, the Air Force Civil Engineer Support Agency
(AFCESA) Utility Rates Management Team (URMT) might need to lead negotiation
efforts. However, this would come at a tremendous cost to bases as utility companies
would more than likely increase electricity rates. If this is not possible, a second
alternative would be to construct privately operated generation facilities on Air Force
installations. Some bases have already begun working with local power companies to
allow generation facilities on military installations that would provide immediate power
to bases during power outages. This last alternative secures the demands for future Air
Force installations, yet it is a long-term approach and not the best option for all bases.
Regardless, bases need to investigate not only their internal power generation capability,
but also ensure plans exist for securing future power.

Recommendations for Future Research
This research is a pioneering study using historical power outage information and
transforming it into an awareness tool for future power disturbances. However, as with
any new effort, there are areas outside the scope of the research which serve as
recommendations for future researchers. This thesis effort subsequently identified
multiple areas that should be pursued to further investigate U.S. power outages and their
implications on Air Force installations. The first recommendation is to refine the
components used in the raster calculator; in particular, the weights associated with the
categories of power loss, people affected, and duration should be further investigated,
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especially their impact as it relates to vulnerability calculations. A second
recommendation would be to pursue the concept of risk and how vulnerability levels
translate into individual risk levels. A third recommendation would be to refine the
collected data and the way in which power outage origins were defined; specifically, is
there a better way to identify outage origins besides service area centroids? A fourth
recommendation involves narrowing the project scope and investigating regional impacts
of power outages in limited areas of the country. This would involve focusing additional
data collection and analyses to a smaller geographic region of the U.S. than the lower 48
states. Lastly, the integration of causes and the created maps would allow a
determination to be made regarding correlations between the causes and the outcomes
experienced from outages.

Conclusion
It has not been until recently that the condition of the nation’s electric grid has
been understood and actions been initiated to fix identified problems. Although, efforts
are currently underway to modernize the electric grid to reduce power disturbances, they
will take significant time to successfully implement. This is further compounded by the
fact that even though more restrictive guidance would be in place, it is no guarantee that
everyone will follow the standards or that the standards will be adequately enforced.
Herein lies the focus behind this research in being able to determine varying
vulnerabilities levels based on historical data. With this thesis, it is possible to address
the following question: what vulnerabilities exist at installations for future power
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outages? This is crucial since the power to assess each Air Force installation’s
vulnerability can only help in being a planning tool for focusing mitigation efforts.
Whether Air Force installations use power to simply operate maintenance shops
or power the flight line, the demand for power is a necessity. Especially as it relates to
military installations, the lack of power can sometimes prove detrimental to not only
daily activities but also national security. Therefore, further efforts by the consumer to
control vulnerabilities to power outages must be taken in order to ensure power is
available to critical facilities.
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APPENDIX A. Form EIA-417 (Emergency Incident and Disturbance Report)
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APPENDIX B. Form OE-417 (Electric Emergency Incident Report)
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APPENDIX C. EIA Power Outages (January 2000 – September 2009)

85

86

87

88

89

90

91

92

93

94

95

96

97

98

APPENDIX D. ArcGIS Procedural Log
METADATA:
Description:
Status of the data: Complete (Update Frequency: None Planned)
Time Period for which the data is relevant: 3/25/2010 at time 1900
Data storage and access information:
File Name: FINAL_Vulnerability Map (2009_03Mar_10).mxd
Data Processing Environment: Microsoft Windows Vista Version 6.0, ESRI
ArcCatalog 9.3.1.3000
Standards used to create this document:
Standard Name: FGDC Content Standards for Digital Geospatial Metadata
Standard Version: FGDC-STD-001-1998
Time Convention used in this document: Local Time
Spatial:
Horizontal Coordinate System:
Geographic Coordinate System Name: World Geodetic System 1984
Horizontal Datum Name: North American Datum of 1983
Bounding Coordinates:
West: -125.378747664 digital degrees
East: -66.184089108 digital degrees
North: 59.957198096 digital degrees
South: 19.149255297 digital degrees
Sources: Electric Disturbance Events – Monthly and Annual Summaries (EIA)
Attributes:
Overview Description:
A unique characteristic of electric power is that it cannot be stored for future use.
Electric energy suppliers, therefore, must build and maintain generating and
transmission facilities capable of meeting the demand levels for electric power at
all times. Tracking disturbances that impact the integrated generating and
transmission facilities is an important Federal task along with examining issues
associated with insufficient capacity reserves.
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Software requirement:
Microsoft Excel, ArcGIS 9.3 (Extensions: Data Management & Spatial Analyst Tools)
1) Download Census Data to working folder
a) Access http://nationalatlas.gov/atlasftp.html
b) Download County Boundaries
i) Boundaries  County Boundaries, 2001  Download countyp020.tar.gz  Save
File
ii) Extract data using a Zipping software within the main directory
c) Download Water Bodies
i) Water  Streams and Waterbodies  Download hydrogm020.tar.gz  Save File
ii) Extract data using a Zipping software within the main directory
d) Download State Boundaries
i) Boundaries  State Boundaries  Download statesp020.tar.gz  Save File
ii) Extract data using a Zipping software within the main directory
e) Access http://www2.census.gov/geo/tiger/TIGER2009/
f) Download Federal Lands
i) Download tl_2009_us_mil  Save File
ii) Extract data using a Zipping software within the main directory

2) Define downloaded layer coordinate systems
a) Open ArcCatalog
b) Locate the downloaded layers  select the files
i) In the right window, right click ‘statesp020’  Properties
(1) Select  Geographic Coordinate Systems  North America  ‘North
American Datum 1983.prj’
(2) Click ‘Add’
ii) In the right window, right click ‘countyp020’  Properties
(1) Select  Geographic Coordinate Systems  North America  ‘North
American Datum 1983.prj’
(2) Click ‘Add’
iii) In the right window, right click ‘hydrogm020’  Properties
(1) Select  Geographic Coordinate Systems  North America  ‘North
American Datum 1983.prj’
(2) Click ‘Add’
iv) In the right window, right click ‘tl_2009_us_mil’  Properties
(1) Select  Geographic Coordinate Systems  North America  ‘North
American Datum 1983.prj’
(2) Click ‘Add’
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3) Create personal geodatabase (GDB) file in ArcGIS
a) ArcToolbox  Data Management Tools  Workspace  Create Personal GDB
b) Create the file within the same direction (but a sub-folder) to the ArcGIS Map file
c) Name the file to something relevant such at ‘PowerOutageAnalysis’

4) Add Downloaded data layers and add to GDB
a) County Data
i) Add data  County Data (shape file)
ii) Filter Data such that only counties for the continental United States are shown
(1) Right Click Layer  Properties  Definition Query  Query Builder
(2) Paste into field  NOT( "STATE" = 'AK' ) AND NOT( "STATE" = 'HI' )
AND NOT( "STATE" = 'PR' ) AND NOT( "STATE" = 'VI' )
iii) Project Data from GCS_North_American_1983 to GSC_WGS_1984
(1) ArcToolbox  Data Management Tools  Projections and Transformations
 Feature  Project
(a) Input Dataset of Feature Class = County layer added
(b) Output Dataset or Feature Class = County_Layer (save within GDB
created earlier)
(c) Output Coordinate System = GCS_WGS_1984
(d) Geographic Transformation  NAD_1983_To_WGS_1984_1
(e) Click OK
(2) Rename new layer to something that describes it (i.e. County Boundaries,
2001)
(3) Remove original countyp020 file from layers
b) State Data
i) Add data  State Data (shape file)
ii) Filter Data such that only counties for the continental United States are shown
(1) Right Click Layer  Properties  Definition Query  Query Builder
(2) Paste into field  NOT ( "STATE" = 'Alaska' ) AND NOT ( "STATE" =
'Hawaii' ) AND NOT ( "STATE" = 'Puerto Rico' ) AND NOT ( "STATE" =
'U.S. Virgin Islands' )
iii) Project Data from GCS_North_American_1983 to GSC_WGS_1984
(1) ArcToolbox  Data Management Tools  Projections and Transformations
 Feature  Project
(a) Input Dataset of Feature Class = State layer added
(b) Output Dataset or Feature Class = State_Layer (save within GDB created
earlier)
(c) Output Coordinate System = GCS_WGS_1984
(d) Geographic Transformation  NAD_1983_To_WGS_1984_1
(e) Click OK
(2) Rename new layer to something that describes it (i.e. State Boundaries, 2005)
(3) Remove original statep020 file from layers
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c) Steams and Waterbodies Data
i) Add data  Steams and Waterbodies Data (shape file)
ii) Filter Data such that only the Great Lakes are shown
(1) Right Click Layer  Properties  Definition Query  Query Builder
(2) Paste into field  "NAME" = 'Lake Huron' OR "NAME" = 'Lake Michigan'
OR "NAME" = 'Lake Ontario' OR "NAME" = 'Lake Superior' OR "NAME" =
'Lake Erie'
iii) Project Data from GCS_North_American_1983 to GSC_WGS_1984
(1) ArcToolbox  Data Management Tools  Projections and Transformations
 Feature  Project
(a) Input Dataset of Feature Class = Water layer added
(b) Output Dataset or Feature Class = Water_Layer (save within GDB created
earlier)
(c) Output Coordinate System = GCS_WGS_1984
(d) Geographic Transformation  NAD_1983_To_WGS_1984_1
(e) Click OK
(2) Rename new layer to something that describes it (i.e. Great Lakes, 2006)
(3) Remove original hydrogm020 from layers
d) Federal Land Data
i) Add data  Federal Land Data (shape file)
ii) Filter Data such that only counties for the continental United States are shown
(1) Right Click Layer  Properties  Definition Query  Query Builder
(2) Paste into field  "FULLNAME" = 'Altus AFB' OR "FULLNAME" =
'Andrews AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 'Arnold AFB' OR "FULLNAME" =
'Barksdale AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 'Beale AFB' OR "FULLNAME" =
'Bolling AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 'Buckley AFB' OR "FULLNAME" =
'Cannon AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 'Charleston AFB' OR "FULLNAME" =
'Columbus AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 'Creech AFB' OR "FULLNAME" =
'Davis- Monthan AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 'Dover AFB' OR "FULLNAME"
= 'Dyess AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 'Edwards AFB' OR "FULLNAME" =
'Eglin AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 'Ellsworth AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 'F E
Warren AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 'Fairchild AFB' OR "FULLNAME" =
'Goodfellow AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 'Grand Forks AFB' OR
"FULLNAME" = 'Hanscom AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 'Hill AFB' OR
"FULLNAME" = 'Holloman AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 'Hurlburt Fld' OR
"FULLNAME" = 'Keesler AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 'Kirtland AFB' OR
"FULLNAME" = 'Lackland AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 'Langley AFB' OR
"FULLNAME" = 'Laughlin AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 'Little Rock AFB' OR
"FULLNAME" = 'Los Angeles Air Force Base (Area A)' OR "FULLNAME"
= 'Luke AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 'Macdill AFB' OR "FULLNAME" =
'Malmstrom AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 'Maxwell AFB' OR "FULLNAME" =
'Maxwell Air Force Base (Gunter Annex)' OR "FULLNAME" = 'McChord
AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 'McConnell AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 'McGuire
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AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 'Minot AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 'Moody AFB'
OR "FULLNAME" = 'Mountain Home AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 'Nellis
AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 'Offutt AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 'Patrick AFB'
OR "FULLNAME" = 'Peterson AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 'Pope AFB' OR
"FULLNAME" = 'Randolph AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 'Robins AFB' OR
"FULLNAME" = 'Scott AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 'Seymour Johnson AFB'
OR "FULLNAME" = 'Shaw AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 'Sheppard AFB' OR
"FULLNAME" = 'Tinker AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 'Travis AFB' OR
"FULLNAME" = 'Tyndall AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 'Vance AFB' OR
"FULLNAME" = 'Vandenberg AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 'Whiteman AFB'
OR "FULLNAME" = 'Wright-Patterson AFB'
iii) Create Centroid of Base Areas
(1) Right Click on Layer  Open Attribute Table
(2) Options  Add Field (Latitude)
(a) Latitude
(i) Name = Centrd_Lat
(ii) Type = Double
(b) Longitude
(i) Name = Centrd_Lon
(ii) Type = Double
(3) Field Calculations
(a) Right Click “Centroid_Lat”  Field Calculator…  Click YES
(b) Check the box for Advanced  Paste:
Dim Output As Double
Dim pArea As IArea
Set pArea = [Shape]
Output = pArea.Centroid.Y
(c) In the box on the bottom, type OUTPUT
(d) Click OK
(e) Right Click “Centroid_Lon”  Field Calculator…  Click YES
(f) Check the box for Advanced  Paste:
Dim Output As Double
Dim pArea As IArea
Set pArea = [Shape]
Output = pArea.Centroid.X
(g) In the box on the bottom, type OUTPUT
(h) Click OK
iv) Project Data from GCS_North_American_1983 to GSC_WGS_1984
(1) Arc Toolbox  Data Management Tools  Projections and Transformations
 Feature  Project
(a) Input Dataset of Feature Class = Federal Land layer added
(b) Output Dataset or Feature Class = AF_Installations_Layer (save within
GDB created earlier)
(c) Output Coordinate System = GCS_WGS_1984
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(d) Geographic Transformation  NAD_1983_To_WGS_1984_1
(e) Click OK
(2) Rename new layer to something that describes it (i.e. AF Installations, 2009)
(3) Remove original tl_2009_us_mil from layers
v) Create XY Data for Installation Centroids
(1) Right Click Projected layer from [iv) (2)]’  Open Attribute Table
(a) Options  Export… (save within GDB file)
(b) Click YES to add it to the current file
(2) Source Tab  Right Click New Table (from above)  Display XY Data…
(a) X Field = Centrd_Lon
(b) Y Field = Centrd_Lat
(c) Click Edit…  Select…  Geographic Coordinate Systems  World 
WGS 1984.prj (click ADD)
(d) Click OK  Click OK
(3) Rename new layer to something that describes it (i.e. AF Installations Points,
2009)

5) Enable ArcToolbox & setup Environments
a) Right click on the ArcToolbox Area  Environments…
b) General Settings
i) Current Workspace  “PowerOutageAnalysis”
ii) Scratch Workspace  “PowerOutageAnalysis”
iii) Output Coordinate System  As Specified Below  GCS_WGS_1984
iv) Output has Z Values  same as input
v) Output has M Values  same as input
vi) Extent  Same as layer “State Boundaries, 2005”
c) Raster Analysis Settings
i) Cell Size  As specified below  0.04
ii) Mask  “State Boundaries, 2005”
d) Click OK

6) Data Collected from EIA necessary to perform the Analysis (for the purpose of this
thesis, all data has been collected and scrubbed within the Excel file ‘GIS Data –
Power Outages.xls’
a) Add Data  Find ‘GIS Data – Power Outages.xls’  Select tab/file 'Outage Data-GIS
Rdy$'  Click Add
b) Source Tab  Right Click 'Outage Data-GIS Rdy$'  Display XY Data…
i) X Field = Long-EST
ii) Y Field = Lat-EST
iii) Click Edit…  Select…  Geographic Coordinate Systems  World  WGS
1984.prj (click ADD)
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iv) Display Tab  Right click the outputted layer from above  Data…  Export
Data…
v) Save within GDB file (created earlier)  Change name to ‘PowerOutage_Output’
vi) Click YES to add it to the map as a new layer file
vii) Right click the old file  Remove
c) Right click (new layer)  Rename: EIA Complete Power Outages_2009

7) Add in Consolidated data (similar to above)
a) Add Data  Find ‘GIS Data – Power Outages.xls’  Select tab/file
‘Summary_ByElecComp$'  Click Add
b) Source Tab  Right Click Summary_ByElecComp $'  Display XY Data…
i) X Field = Long-EST
ii) Y Field = Lat-EST
iii) Click Edit…  Select…  Geographic Coordinate Systems  World  WGS
1984.prj (click ADD)
iv) Display Tab  Right click the outputted layer from above  Data…  Export
Data…
v) Save within GDB file (created earlier)  Change name to
‘PowerOutageCons_Output’
vi) Click YES to add it to the map as a new layer file
vii) Right click the old file  Remove
c) Right click (new layer)  Rename: EIA Consolidated Power Outages_2009

8) FORMATTING:
a) Display Tab  Highlight the following layers (downloaded/modified layers):
i) AF Installation Pts, 2009
ii) AF Installations, 2009
iii) Great Lakes, 2006
iv) County Boundaries, 2006
v) State Boundaries, 2005
vi) Right click  Group (change the name to ‘Existing Layers’)
b) Display Tab  Highlight the following layers (downloaded/modified layers):
i) EIA Complete Power Outages_2009
ii) EIA Consolidated Power Outages_2009
iii) Right click  Group (change the name to ‘EIA Power Outages’)

9) Analysis (Individual Outages) – Include all changes done to the maps as well
a) Inverse Distance Weighted (MW Loss)
i) ArcToolbox Spatial Analyst Tools  Interpolation  IDW
(1) Input point features = EIA Complete Power Outages_2009
(2) Z value field = MW_Loss
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(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

Output Raster = IDW_Ind_MW_Loss (save within GDB created earlier)
Output cell size (optional) = 0.04
Power = 2
Search Radius (option) = Variable
(a) Number of points = 12
(b) Maximum Distance = (BLANK)
(7) Input barrier polyline features (optional) = (BLANK)
ii) Right click the added layer  Properties…
(1) Display (TAB)  Transparency = 45%
(2) Symbology (TAB)  Show (Left side)  Click CLASSIFIED  Click YES
(a) Classification  Classes = 5
(b) Classification  Classify  Method = Natural Breaks (Jenks)  Click
OK
(c) Color Ramp  GREEN to RED (left to right)
iii) Click OK
b) Inverse Distance Weighted (Number of people affected)
i) ArcToolbox Spatial Analyst Tools  Interpolation  IDW
(1) Input point features = EIA Complete Power Outages_2009
(2) Z value field = No_Affecte
(3) Output Raster = IDW_Ind_No_Affected (save within GDB created earlier)
(4) Output cell size (optional) = 0.04
(5) Power = 2
(6) Search Radius (option) = Variable
(a) Number of points = 12
(b) Maximum Distance = (BLANK)
(7) Input barrier polyline features (optional) = (BLANK)
ii) Right click the added layer  Properties…
(1) Display (TAB)  Transparency = 45%
(2) Symbology (TAB)  Show (Left side)  Click CLASSIFIED  Click YES
(a) Classification  Classes = 5
(b) Classification  Classify  Method = Natural Breaks (Jenks)  Click
OK
(c) Color Ramp  GREEN to RED (left to right)
iii) Click OK
c) Inverse Distance Weighted (Outage Total Duration)
i) ArcToolbox Spatial Analyst Tools  Interpolation  IDW
(1) Input point features = EIA Complete Power Outages_2009
(2) Z value field = Total_HRs
(3) Output Raster = IDW_Ind_Hours_Off (save within GDB created earlier)
(4) Output cell size (optional) = 0.04
(5) Power = 2
(6) Search Radius (option) = Variable
(a) Number of points = 12
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(b) Maximum Distance = (BLANK)
(7) Input barrier polyline features (optional) = (BLANK)
ii) Right click the added layer  Properties…
(1) Display (TAB)  Transparency = 45%
(2) Symbology (TAB)  Show (Left side)  Click CLASSIFIED  Click YES
(a) Classification  Classes = 5
(b) Classification  Classify  Method = Natural Breaks (Jenks)  Click
OK
(c) Color Ramp  GREEN to RED (left to right)
iii) Click OK
d) Raster Calculator (Individual Outage Calculated Vulnerability)
i) Ensure the Spatial Analyst Toolbar is enabled. If not:
(1) View  Toolbars  Spatial Analyst
(2) Dock the toolbar
ii) Spatial Analyst  Raster Calculator
(1) Copy the following expression to the open space 
(([IDW_Cons_Hours_Off] / 52.59) * 0.4) + (([IDW_Cons_MW_Loss] /
598.78) * 0.5) + (([IDW_Cons_No_Affected] / 195553.13) * 0.1)
(2) Click Evaluate (it might take up to an hour to complete the analysis, depending
on computer speeds)
iii) Right click the added layer  Properties…
(1) General (TAB)  Layer Name = ‘IDW_Ind_Calculated_Vulnerability’
(2) Display (TAB)  Transparency = 45%
(3) Symbology (TAB)  Show (Left side)  Click CLASSIFIED  Click YES
(a) Classification  Classes = 5
(b) Classification  Classify  Method = Natural Breaks (Jenks)  Click
OK
(c) Color Ramp  GREEN to RED (left to right)
iv) Click OK

10) Analysis (Consolidated Outages)
a) Inverse Distance Weighted (MW Loss)
i) ArcToolbox Spatial Analyst Tools  Interpolation  IDW
(1) Input point features = EIA Complete Power Outages_2009
(2) Z value field = MW_Loss
(3) Output Raster = IDW_Cons_MW_Loss (save within GDB created earlier)
(4) Output cell size (optional) = 0.04
(5) Power = 2
(6) Search Radius (option) = Variable
(a) Number of points = 12
(b) Maximum Distance = (BLANK)
(7) Input barrier polyline features (optional) = (BLANK)
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ii) Right click the added layer  Properties…
(1) Display (TAB)  Transparency = 45%
(2) Symbology (TAB)  Show (Left side)  Click CLASSIFIED  Click YES
(a) Classification  Classes = 5
(b) Classification  Classify  Method = Natural Breaks (Jenks)  Click
OK
(c) Color Ramp  GREEN to RED (left to right)
iii) Click OK
b) Inverse Distance Weighted (Number of people affected)
i) ArcToolbox Spatial Analyst Tools  Interpolation  IDW
(1) Input point features = EIA Complete Power Outages_2009
(2) Z value field = No_Affected
(3) Output Raster = IDW_Cons _No_Affected (save within GDB created earlier)
(4) Output cell size (optional) = 0.04
(5) Power = 2
(6) Search Radius (option) = Variable
(a) Number of points = 12
(b) Maximum Distance = (BLANK)
(7) Input barrier polyline features (optional) = (BLANK)
ii) Right click the added layer  Properties…
(1) Display (TAB)  Transparency = 45%
(2) Symbology (TAB)  Show (Left side)  Click CLASSIFIED  Click YES
(a) Classification  Classes = 5
(b) Classification  Classify  Method = Natural Breaks (Jenks)  Click
OK
(c) Color Ramp  GREEN to RED (left to right)
iii) Click OK
c) Inverse Distance Weighted (Outage Total Duration)
i) ArcToolbox Spatial Analyst Tools  Interpolation  IDW
(1) Input point features = EIA Complete Power Outages_2009
(2) Z value field = Total_HRs
(3) Output Raster = IDW_Cons_Hours_Off (save within GDB created earlier)
(4) Output cell size (optional) = 0.04
(5) Power = 2
(6) Search Radius (option) = Variable
(a) Number of points = 12
(b) Maximum Distance = (BLANK)
(7) Input barrier polyline features (optional) = (BLANK)
ii) Right click the added layer  Properties…
(1) Display (TAB)  Transparency = 45%
(2) Symbology (TAB)  Show (Left side)  Click CLASSIFIED  Click YES
(a) Classification  Classes = 5
(b) Classification  Classify  Method = Natural Breaks (Jenks)  Click
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OK
(c) Color Ramp  GREEN to RED (left to right)
iii) Click OK
d) Raster Calculator (Consolidated Outage Calculated Vulnerability)
i) Ensure the Spatial Analyst Toolbar is enabled. If not:
(1) View  Toolbars  Spatial Analyst
(2) Dock the toolbar
ii) Spatial Analyst  Raster Calculator
(1) Copy the following expression to the open space 
(([IDW_Cons_Hours_Off] / 212.966) * 0.4) + (([IDW_Cons_MW_Loss] /
2375.012) * 0.5) + (([IDW_Cons_No_Affected] / 754639.069) * 0.1)
(2) Click Evaluate (it might take up to an hour to complete the analysis, depending
on computer speeds)
iii) Right click the added layer  Properties…
(1) General (TAB)  Layer Name = ‘IDW_Cons_Calculated_Vulnerability’
(2) Display (TAB)  Transparency = 45%
(3) Symbology (TAB)  Show (Left side)  Click CLASSIFIED  Click YES
(a) Classification  Classes = 5
(b) Classification  Classify  Method = Natural Breaks (Jenks)  Click
OK
(c) Color Ramp  GREEN to RED (left to right)
iv) Click OK
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APPENDIX E. Calculated IDW (Number Affected)
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APPENDIX F. Calculated IDW (Duration)
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APPENDIX G. Calculated IDW (Power Loss)
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APPENDIX H. Calculated Weighted Vulnerability
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